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FELONY FINANCIAL
DISENFRANCHISEMENT
Neel U. Sukhatme*, Alexander Billy**, ＆ Gaurav Bagwe***
Individuals with prior felony convictions often must complete all terms of their sentence
before they regain voter eligibility. Many jurisdictions include legal-financial obligations
(LFOs) — fines, fees, and/or restitution stemming from convictions — in the terms of the
sentence. Twenty-eight states, governing over 182 million Americans, either directly or
indirectly tie LFO repayment to voting privileges, a practice we call felony financial
disenfranchisement.
Proponents of felony financial disenfranchisement posit that returning citizens
must satisfy the financial obligations stemming from convictions to restore themselves as
community equals. Moralism aside, others claim low rates of electoral participation
among those with felony convictions imply such disenfranchisement is inconsequential.
In this Article, we challenge both of these claims. To do so, we draw upon new
empirical and contextual evidence from Florida, which disenfranchises more returning
citizens than any other state. We rely on data and natural experiments from a nonpartisan, non-profit advocacy group that we launched called Free Our Vote.
The Article illustrates how felony financial disenfranchisement creates
uncertainty around voter eligibility, which likely deters many otherwise qualified voters
with felony records from participating. We also measure, for the first time, how felony
financial disenfranchisement impacts voter participation, using a debt relief program
implemented by Free Our Vote. Specifically, we compare electoral participation between
registered voters whose LFOs were eliminated by Free Our Vote against virtually
identical debtors who did not benefit from our program. We find debt relief increased
voter turnout by approximately 26% among this group during the 2020 election.
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The contextual and empirical evidence we present unequivocally demonstrates
that narratives in favor of felony financial disenfranchisement are misguided. Failure to
pay criminal court debt typically arises from bureaucratic complications and opacity as
well as indigency. Thus, ethics-oriented arguments grossly misconstrue the challenges
returning citizens face. Likewise, the purported benefits of induced criminal court revenue
from LFOs are overstated. Given the countervailing costs tied to criminal debt, and its
disparate impact on indigent and Black defendants, we conclude that felony financial
disenfranchisement is on balance a socially harmful policy that should be eliminated.

I. INTRODUCTION
In 2018, a supermajority of Florida voters passed a ballot initiative that had the potential to
incorporate more Americans into the electorate than any single measure in nearly a halfcentury. The initiative, known as Amendment 4, reversed the state’s historic practice of
permanently barring individuals with felony records from voting in Florida. Upon
“completion of all terms of sentence including probation or parole,” any returning citizen,
excluding those convicted of murder or a sexual offense, could now participate in elections.1
Broadly interpreted, this initiative conceivably re-enfranchised 1.6 million individuals.2
The campaign that sponsored and guided Amendment 4 through the approval process
emphasized the redemptive nature of the initiative. Its slogan, “when a debt is paid, it’s paid”
appealed to a diverse segment of the population, especially Black and economically distressed
communities.3 It also garnered the support of public interest groups across the political
spectrum, ranging from the ACLU4 to Koch Industry partners.5 The narrative that
completing terms of one’s sentences made them “whole”6 unified political interests such that
almost no organized opposition to Amendment 4 existed.7
While convenient and politically expedient relative to other narratives,8 the prevailing
dialogue surrounding Amendment 4 ignored nuances of its implementation. Ambiguity
surrounding the “terms of sentence” language emerged even before its passage. Chiefly,
1 FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4; Constitutional Amendment Petition Form for Voting Restoration Amendment, FLA.
DEP’T
OF
STATE,
DIV.
OF
ELECTIONS
(Oct.
31,
2014),
https://dos.elections.myflorida.com/initiatives/fulltext/pdf/64388-1.pdf.
2 See JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 275 tbl.A8.1 (2008) (reporting 827,207 disenfranchised citizens in Florida as of the 2000
presidential election); Christopher Uggen, Ryan Larson, & Sarah Shannon, 6 Million Lost Voters: State-Level
Estimates
of
Felony
Disenfranchisement,
The
Sentencing
Project,
15
tbl.3,
at
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/6-million-lost-voters-state-level-estimates-felonydisenfranchisement-2016/. (estimating 1,686,318 disenfranchised returning citizens in 2016).
3 See Michael Morse, The Future of Felon Disenfranchisement Reform: Evidence from the Campaign to Restore Voting
Rights in Florida, 109 CALIF. L. REV. 1143, at 1170 fig.6, 1171 fig.7 (documenting support among Black and poor
White communities).
4 See id. at 1154 fig.2 (illustrating contributions to Amendment 4 campaign).
5 See Press Release, Second Chances Florida, Freedom Partners Chamber of Commerce Endorses Amendment
4.
6 See Lawrence Mower, Amendment 4 Will Likely Cost `Millions’ to Carry Out. Here’s Why., TAMPA BAY TIMES (Apr.
4, 2019), at http://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/2019/04/04/amendment-4-will-likely-cost-millions-tocarry-out-heres-why.
7 See Morse, supra note __.
8 See Supplemental Appendix to Lee Reply Brief, attach. B, at 47 (“[f]ocusing on the racial element of
disenfranchisement is not an effective way to grow support, particularly among Republican and Independent
voters . . . .””).
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uncertainty pertained to the status of restitution, fines, fees, and other court costs tied to the
sentence; collectively, these levies are referred to as criminal assessments or legal-financial
obligations (LFOs).9
The Amendment 4 campaign appears to have accepted the premise that returning
citizens would need to clear any restitution balances to become eligible.10 Their initial stance
on other forms of LFOs is much less clear. Internal documents illustrate the campaign
acknowledged the extent of criminal assessments (40% of all returning citizens). That said, it
did not seem to believe these debts would dramatically reduce the scope of Amendment 4.11
While the text itself does not refer to assessments, the campaign formally accepted their
inclusion.12
Supporters hoped “because neither [they] nor the state has any hard data on the
fines/fees population” that over a million people would benefit from Amendment 4.13 If so,
this quixotic notion might not have been shared by all of those swayed by the redemptive
aspect of the initiative; for some, all assessments needed to be paid to earn full
reconciliation.14 Others, tantalized by the prospect of additional revenue for the state through
fee repayments, latched onto the LFO requirement. The potential for induced funding for
courts appealed to even left-leaning partisans.15 Still others were plausibly motivated by the
fear that unconditional re-enfranchisement would swing elections in favor of Democrats.16
For them, a mandate that returning citizens satisfy LFOs meant preventing a potential “blue
wave.”17
These factors spurred political forces to incorporate as many financial preconditions
as possible. They did so via a 2019 bill known as Senate Bill 7066 (S.B.7066). That bill
implemented Amendment 4 with a broad interpretation of sentence terms: all fines, fees,
and/or restitution must be settled to qualify for the electorate.18 The terms included other
9 See Fin. Impact Estimating Conf., Fla. Off. of Econ. & Demographic Rsch., Complete Initiative Financial
Information Statement Voting Restoration Amendment (14-01) 2 (2016), http://edr.state.fl.us/Content/constitutionalamendments/2018Ballot/VRA_Report.pdf (“It is unclear whether the phrase ‘terms of sentence’ includes
payment of court-ordered restitution, fines and court costs.”)
10 Second Chances Florida, National Military Veterans Organization VoteVets Announces Support for Amendment 4
(Sept. 27, 2018), at https://capitalsoup.com/2018/09/27/national-military-veterans-organization-votevetsannounces-support-for-amendment-4/.
11 See Memorandum from Howard Simon, Exec. Dir., ACLU Fla., and Marc Mauer, Exec. Dir., Sentencing
Project, to Exec. Bd., Second Chances Team (Feb. 11, 2018).
12 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. Re: Voting Restoration Amend., 215 So. 3d
1202 (Fla. 2017) (Nos. 16-1785, 16-1981) https://wfsu.org/gavel2gavel/transcript/pdfs/16-1785_16-1981.pdf.
13 See Memorandum from Howard Simon, Exec. Dir., ACLU Fla., and Marc Mauer, Exec. Dir., Sentencing
Project, to Exec. Bd., Second Chances Team (Feb. 11, 2018).
14 See Jones, 975 F.3d at 1036 (noting that the state argued that a LFO satisfaction requirement ensures that
eligibility applies to “...only those felons who have paid their debt to society and been fully rehabilitated”).
15 See Daniel Rivero, Co-Author And Attorney For Florida's Amendment 4 Helped Create Statewide Fines And Fees
Policy, WLRN Miami at https://www.wlrn.org/news/2019-03-27/co-author-and-attorney-for-floridasamendment-4-helped-create-statewide-fines-and-fees-policy (quoting Justice Barbara Pariente, long known as
one of the most liberal justices on the bench, explicitly connecting the need to pay fines to the right to vote in
the 2018 hearing: “This would actually help the state because if fines, costs and restitution are a requirement,
for those that want to vote, there’s a big motivation to pay unpaid costs, fines and restitution…”).
16 See Emily Bazelon, Will Florida’s Ex-Felons Finally Regain the Right to Vote?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2018)
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/26/magazine/ex-felons-voting-rights-florida.html.
17 See, e.g., Nate Cohn, A ‘Blue Florida’? There Are No Quick Demographic Fixes for Democrats, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1,
2018), at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/01/upshot/a-blue-florida-there-are-no-quick-demographic-fixesfor-democrats.html.
18 S.B. 7066, 2019 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2019), at https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2019/7066/BillText/er/PDF.
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criteria as well. For example, S.B.7066 requires returning citizens to settle all assessments that
had been converted to civil judgments; conversions arise when the individual cannot afford
to pay the criminal debt.19
S.B.7066 implements something we call “felony financial disenfranchisement” (FFD).
It effectively reduced the number of individuals re-enfranchised under Amendment 4 by
approximately 1 million voters.20 While S.B.7066 is an extreme example, FFD is not unique
to Florida; Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Kansas, South Dakota,
Tennessee, and Texas also deny re-enfranchisement indefinitely based on non-payment of
certain criminal assessments.21 Another fifteen states practice an indirect form of FFD,
whereby parole or probation can be extended for those who do not repay criminal
assessments; in turn, voting rights are delayed for those still under supervision.22 In sum, 128
million Americans live in states where FFD is regularly practiced.23
Proponents of FFD assert two primary claims in support of the policy. First, they
suggest that returning citizens must satisfy the financial obligations stemming from their
convictions to restore themselves as community equals. Those who hold this view maintain
S.B.7066 executes the will of the voters; they believe Amendment 4 supporters formally
agreed that sentence terms include criminal court debt. Because the redemptive narrative
aligned with voters’ views, adoption of S.B.7066 facilitates reconciliation. Through this lens,
Amendment 4 is consistent with another 2018 initiative, Amendment 6; Amendment 6
guarantees crime victims receive timely restitution.24 Ergo, restitution and other assessments

19

Id.
See Wayne Washington, Study: Law undercuts restoring felon voting rights, THE LEDGER (Aug. 18, 2019), at
https://www.theledger.com/story/news/crime/2019/08/19/study-law-undercuts-restoring-felon-votingrights/4436834007/ (referencing work of Prof. Daniel Smith, who conducted preliminary research for groups
advocating against Senate Bill 7066, finding that the bill would reduce the number of voters re-enfranchised
under Amendment 4 by an estimated 82%); see also See Jones v. DeSantis, 975 F.3d 1016, 1066 (11th Cir. 2020)
(en banc) (Jordan, J., dissenting) (noting that “of the over one million people convicted of a qualifying felony in
Florida who have otherwise completed the terms of their sentences, 77.4% owe some form of [legal-financial
obligation]”).
21 See Margaret Love & David Schlussel, Collateral Consequences Resource Center, Who Must Pay to Regain the Vote?
A 50-State Survey, at 5 (Nov. 2020), at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3873420 (last visited
Jan 28, 2022). Alabama, Arkansas, and Florida have the strictest provisions, as they block re-enfranchisement if
there are any unpaid LFOs relating to a felony conviction. Id. For disqualifying convictions, Arizona and
Tennessee block re-enfranchisement for unpaid restitution; Georgia and Texas block for unpaid fines; and
Kansas blocks for unpaid fines and certain restitution. Id. Connecticut prevents re-enfranchisement for LFOs
associated with out-of-state and federal convictions, whereas South Dakota blocks for convictions after June 30,
2012. Id. Together these states govern 81 million Americans.
22 These states are: Alaska, Delaware, Idaho, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, New
York, North Carolina, South Carolina, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. at 5. The State of
Washington was on this list until January 1, 2022, when it began to automatically restore voting rights for those
individuals “not currently serving a [Department of Corrections] sentence of total confinement in prison.”
Washington Secretary of State, Elections, Felony Convictions and Voting Rights, at
https://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/voters/felons-and-voting-rights.aspx. (last visited Feb. 8, 2022).
23 And more states might soon be subject to FFD. See Joshua M. Feinzig, Felon Re-Enfranchisement and the Problem
of “Lost” Rights, YALE L.J. FORUM (Jan. 14, 2022) (“Perhaps in response to electoral shifts and the green light from
lower federal courts upholding similar policies, state lawmakers across the country continue to embed fine-,
court-fee-, and restitution-repayment requirements in restoration proposals.”).
24 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16. As the sponsor of S.B.7066 noted in defense of the bill, “Voters made it crystal clear
victims have the right to receive restitution.” Gray Rohrer and Skyler Swisher, Florida Lawmakers Pass Amendment
4 Restrictions on Ex-Felon Voting Rights as Democrats Fume on Wild Day, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
https://www.orlandosentinel.com/politics/os-ne-florida-legislature-session-friday-20190503-story.html.
20
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must be paid in full to become “whole.” The franchise, much like other privileges including
driver’s licenses, are thus benefits to be enjoyed by those with personal integrity.25
Second, supporters of FFD claim that low rates of electoral participation among those
with felony convictions imply the effect of FFD is inconsequential. Comments from a former
Florida county commissioner, who was herself disenfranchised after she was convicted of a
felony and paid $100,000 in fines out of her own assets, illustrate the argument: “Whitecollar felons, they are going to vote. But people who have lived the drug and gangster lifestyle,
they are not rushing out to be able to be part of any system.”26
In this Article, we challenge these assertions. Using new empirical and contextual
evidence, we find that eliminating FFD by paying off criminal court debt significantly
increases voter participation. We document this result via natural experiments and quasiexperimental evidence, using data collected from a non-partisan, non-profit advocacy group
that we launched called Free Our Vote.
Free Our Vote informs returning citizens about voter eligibility and intervenes on
behalf of those with outstanding balances by settling their debts. In 2020, Free Our Vote
began a project in Florida. Marshaling a team of economists, law students, and data scientists,
Free Our Vote collected comprehensive criminal court, assessment, incarceration, and voter
registration data for nearly half a million returning citizens in Florida. Together with its
partners, Free Our Vote then cleared criminal court debts for over one thousand registered
voters prior to the 2020 election, and notified tens of thousands more that they were free to
vote.
This Article analyzes Free Our Vote’s interventions using a range of causal empirical
methodologies, including traditional multivariate regression analysis and more sophisticated
quasi-random treatment designs. It shows that by informing eligible registered voters who
owed no fines and fees that they were free to vote, Free Our Vote and its partners increased
their turnout by approximately 16%. We argue that these results capture the extent to which
Florida’s LFO-based voting restrictions chilled legally registered voters, discouraging them
from casting ballots.
The piece then shows similar, if not stronger, results for those individuals for whom
Free Our Vote repaid criminal court debt. Among this population, our intervention increased
voter turnout by approximately 26%. These results demonstrate, for the first time, that
eliminating FFD not only affects voter behavior in theory, but in fact can lead to a large and
statistically significant increase in voter turnout.
Next, we explain why the purported social benefits of FFD are illusory in practice. We
illustrate how LFO repayment is a flawed moral predicate for restoring voting privileges, given
the labyrinth that most former defendants must traverse to discover and repay the relevant

25 See, e.g., Roger Clegg, George T. Conway II. & Kenneth K. Lee, The Case Against Felon Voting, 2 U. ST. THOMAS

J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 18 (2008) (“[S]ociety considers convicts, even those who have completed their prison terms,
to be less trustworthy and responsible than non-convicted citizens. In other areas of the law, full rights and
privileges are not always restored to convicts, even though they may have ‘paid [their] debt to society.’”).
26 John Pacenti, Felon Voting: Forcing Fees to be Paid Not an Issue for Some Wealthy Felons, PALM BEACH POST (Oct.
1, 2020). Opponents of S.B.7066 were not so sanguine about its impact. See ACLU of Florida Statement on House
Bill Restricting Amendment 4, ACLU Florida (March 19, 2019) https://www.aclufl.org/en/press-releases/acluflorida-statement-house-bill-restricting-amendment-4. (quoting Kirk Bailey, the political director of the ACLU:
“If this bill passes, it will undoubtedly continue to disenfranchise those who have already served their time and
paid their debt to society…This will inevitably prevent individuals from voting based on the size of one’s bank
account.”).
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assessment. We also show how, contrary to their stated goals, LFOs generate minimal revenue
in practice, as the vast majority of assessments are uncollected.
The Article then documents the substantial social costs that FFD entails. We show
how such a system disproportionately blocks voting access for poor and Black voters, as those
groups are overrepresented among registered voters owing court debt. We also highlight
existing research on other long-term harms caused by felony disenfranchisement, including
social alienation and increased recidivism.
Our results have substantial implications for current state and federal policy
discussions on voting rights and the criminal legal system. Taken together, our analyses
suggest that the costs of FFD easily outweigh its purported benefits. We conclude that
eliminating FFD would correct this imbalance, and appropriately restore the voting rights of
millions of Americans.

II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF VOTER DISENFRANCHISEMENT
This Section chronicles voter disenfranchisement in the United States, and the rise of felony
financial disenfranchisement over the past fifty years. We focus on this practice in Florida,
where data and advocacy interventions enable us to empirically assess the impact of FFD and
its supporting narratives. In particular, we highlight Amendment 4 and its subsequent legal
limitations.

A.

Early Republic and Post-Reconstruction

Voter disenfranchisement has long been part of the American criminal legal and electoral
systems. Its provenance, however, begins in classical societies. In ancient Greece, criminal
offenders could be proclaimed as “infamous,” which would strip them of their ability to appear
in court, attend assemblies, serve in the army, or vote.27 Similarly, the label of “infamia” in
ancient Rome condemned convicts to “civil death” for their crimes.28 This practice, later
adopted in medieval Europe and England through the practice of “outlawry,”29 involved “
put[ting] an end to the person by destroying the basis of legal capacity, as did natural death
by destroying physical existence.”30 Civil death was sometimes accomplished by stripping
convicted criminals of their property rights;31 in some situations, it involved subjecting them
to physical injury or death.32 For offenders who had voting privileges, civil death entailed
disenfranchisement.33
27 Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: Citizenship, Criminality, and “The Purity of the Ballot Box”, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 1300 (1989) (quoting Special Project, The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV.
929, 94I (1970)).
28 See, e.g., Note, Restoring the Ex-Offender’s Right to Vote: Background and Developments, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 721,
722 (1973) (citing A GREENRIDGE, INFAMIA: ITS PLACE IN ROMAN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW 9 (1894)).
29 See id.
30 Robin L. Nunn, Lock Them Up and Throw Away the Vote, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 763, 765 (2005) (quoting CARLO
CALISSE, A HISTORY OF ITALIAN LAW 511 (Little Brown 1928)); see also Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death”: The
Ideological Paradox Of Criminal Disenfranchisement Law In The United States, 2002 WISC. L. REV. 1045 (2002).
31 See also R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 917
(2004) (citing THE SENTENCING PROJECT & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING THE VOTE: THE IMPACT OF
FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (1998)).
32 See id.
33 See id.
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While the American colonies dropped many of the practices associated with civil
death, they continued to deny many criminal offenders voting privileges.34 By 1821, at least
eleven states barred individuals convicted of certain criminal offenses from voting.35 Similar
to its use in England, voter disenfranchisement largely focused on targeting people of
“immoral” character; to be a constituent of the electorate, “a voter ought to be a moral
person.”36 Early state constitutions commonly required voters to evince good character;
generally, “infamous” offenses and those resulting in prison sentences led to
disenfranchisement.37 Common examples of this included “perjury, forgery, bribery, and
larceny . . . as [well as] dueling.”38
During this time, broad groups of Americans typically had no voting privileges. Most
notably, state laws prohibited ballot access to Black men,39 women, and in many instances,
people who had not lived in a state for a sufficiently long period of time.40 Property
restrictions were also commonplace in the early Republic, though they were gradually
eliminated during the first half of the nineteenth century.41 Given these extant limitations,
criminal voter disenfranchisement did not specifically block most people in these groups from
the ballot box; likely, other blunter tools already succeeded in accomplishing this.
Voter disenfranchisement evolved, however, as ballot access expanded. Following the
Civil War, Reconstruction brought about a new era of privileges and their usurpation. After
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 186842 and the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870,43
the franchise extended (at least de jure if not de facto) to Black male voters.44 In response, many
states immediately sought to limit Black voting power. Between 1865 and 1900, nearly half of
all states amended the scope of disenfranchisement laws,45 typically covering a wide range of
34

See id.; see also Ewald, supra note __, at 1060 (“English colonists in North America transplanted much of the
mother country’s common law regarding the civil disabilities of convicts, and supplemented it with statutes
regarding suffrage.”).
35 See Ewald, supra note __, at 1062 (listing states as Alabama, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Missouri, New York, Ohio, and Virginia) (citing Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 450 (2d
Cir. 1967) (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 97)).
36 Alexander Keyssar, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED
STATES 163 (quoted by Ewald, supra note __, at 1063 n.71).
37 See KIRK HAROLD PORTER, A HISTORY OF SUFFRAGE IN THE UNITED STATES,148 (Greenwood Press 1971)
(photo. reprint 1969) (1918) (cited by Ewald, supra note __, at 1063).
38 See Ewald, supra note __, at 163.
39 As of 1860, Black men had voting rights in just six states. See Ewald, supra note __, at 1063 n.73 and
accompanying text (six states were Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and
Vermont). Four of these states (Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont) did not disenfranchise
criminals. See id.
40 See also Ewald, supra note __, at 1060 (noting “of those commonly disqualified on the eve of the Civil War—
women, men without extended residency, blacks, soldiers, students, the institutionalized mentally ill, and
criminals—only the last two groups are still broadly disenfranchised today.”).
41 See JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 52 (2006) (noting that “10 of the original 13 states had property requirements”); see id. (stating that
by the mid-nineteenth century, “[m]any states abolished requirements of taxpaying and property ownership
through constitutional revisions, while newer states never imposed the restrictions.”)
42 See U.S. CONST. amend. 14.
43 See U.S. CONST. amend. 15, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”)
44 Women generally continued to be largely disenfranchised until the twentieth century, and especially until
after passage of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920. See U.S. CONST. amend. 19.
45 See MANZA & UGGEN, supra note __, at 55 (2006)) (noting that “19 states adopted or amended laws restricting
the voting rights of criminal offenders” during this time period).
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felonies that were not disenfranchising under the common law.46 Many of these changes
happened in the fifteen years after the Civil War ended; thirteen states (including nine former
Confederate ones) expanded felony disenfranchisement during that time period.47
Southern states often explicitly invoked claims of White supremacy to justify these
changes in law. For example, Mississippi held a constitutional convention in 1890; despite
being a Black majority state,48 only one Black representative attended out of 134 members.
The new constitution instituted several policies overtly designed to limit Black participation
at the polls, including charging a $2 poll tax (which would be over $61 in today’s dollars)49 and
designating a host of new criminal offenses that would trigger disenfranchisement. These new
felony disenfranchisement provisions were specifically designed to incorporate offenses for
which Black people were thought to be more likely to be convicted, while excluding other
more serious offenses (e.g., rape and murder) that White people engaged in with equal or
greater propensity.
In upholding these provisions against a federal constitutional challenge six years later,
the Mississippi Supreme Court plainly acknowledged, “The [constitutional] convention swept
the circle of expedients to obstruct the exercise of the franchise by the negro race.”50 It
further described the racist logic underlying the changes: “By reason of its previous condition
of servitude and dependence, th[e Black] race had acquired or accentuated certain
peculiarities of habit, of temperament and of character, which clearly distinguished it, as a
race, from that of the whites—a patient docile people, but careless, landless, and migratory
within narrow limits, without aforethought, and its criminal members given rather to furtive
offenses than to the robust crimes of the whites.”51
Following Mississippi’s lead, every other state in the Deep South also held
“disenfranchising conventions” in the following twenty years.52 Hence, during Reconstruction
and afterward, felony disenfranchisement was actively wielded to limit the power of Black
voices.
46

See id.
See Erin Kelley, Racism & Felony Disenfranchisement, Brennan Center for Justice, at
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Disenfranchisement_History.pdf (citing MANZA
& UGGEN, supra note __, at 37-39, 235) (listing disenfranchising states as Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas). This
constituted one third of all states at the time. Id.
48 Mississippi was 55% Black after the Civil War. See Jason Phillips, Reconstruction in Mississippi, 1865-1876,
Mississippi History Now, at https://www.mshistorynow.mdah.ms.gov/issue/reconstruction-in-mississippi-18651876. The U.S. government recorded 1,009,487 Black people in the 1910 Census, out of a total population of
1,797,114 (56.2%). See U.S. Bureau of the Census, NEGRO POPULATION 1790-1915 at 36, available at
https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/1910/black-population-1790-1915/00480330.pdf
(last
visited Feb. 5, 2022); U.S. Census Bureau, Resident Population and Apportionment of the U.S. House of
Representatives: Mississippi, available at https://www2.census.gov/library/visualizations/2000/dec/2000residentpopulation/mississippi.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2022).
49 Taking the average annual rate of inflation of 2.63% between 1890 and 2022, we can see $2(1.0263)132 = $61.55.
See CPI Inflation Calculation, at https://www.in2013dollars.com/us/inflation/1890 (last visited Feb. 4, 2022).
50 See Ratliff v. Beale, 74 Miss. 247, 266 (Miss. 1896).
51 See id.
52 See Daniel S. Goldman, The Modern-Day Literacy Test: Felon Disenfranchisement and Race Discrimination, 57 STAN.
L. REV. 611, 616 (2004) (citing SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE
OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 101 (2d ed. 2002). See also id. (“The purpose of these conventions was clear:
‘Discrimination!’ exclaimed Carter Glass, a delegate to the Virginia Convention of 1906. ‘Why that is precisely
what we propose; that exactly is what this convention was elected for.” (citing C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS
OF THE NEW SOUTH, 1877-1913, at 321 (1971)).
47
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Reforms and Limitations

After a period of expansion in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, felony voting
restrictions remained largely intact and unaltered until the late 1950s.53 The tide turned with
the rise of the Civil Rights movement and passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. From
the late 1950s through the early 1970s, twenty-three states amended or removed voting bans
for some individuals who had past felony convictions.54 The most substantial changes involved
removing lifetime voting bans for people with such convictions; between 1960 and 2002, the
number of states imposing this form of “civil death” dropped from about 70% to 25%.55
Significant progress continued in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.
Between 1997 and 2018, twenty-three states reduced certain restrictions in their felony
disenfranchisement laws.56 Several jurisdictions continued the trend of amending or repealing
lifetime disenfranchisement laws. Some revised laws that restricted voting privileges for
people on community supervision; others relaxed procedures for those seeking to regain
voting privileges after completing their sentence.57 In total, the Sentencing Project estimates
these reforms re-enfranchised 1.4 million people.58
Despite this progress, the estimated number of people disenfranchised due to past
felony convictions swelled from 1.2 million to 5.2 million people between 1976 and 2020.59
Three countervailing developments help explain this seeming anomaly.
First, legal challenges to felony disenfranchisement laws typically failed in the courts;
hence, reformers were limited to pushing changes through legislative or executive channels.
The most significant legal roadblock was erected in 1974, when the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of California’s felony disenfranchisement statute in Richardson v.
Ramirez.60 There, the challengers claimed the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause
under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court rejected this argument based on
a different provision of the same amendment, Section 2, which states in relevant part
(emphasis added):
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers . . . But when the right to vote at any election for the choice
of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or
the members of the Legislature thereof, is . . . in any way abridged, except for
participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall
be reduced . . .61

53

See MANZA & UGGEN, supra note __, at 80.
54 See Angela Behrens, Christopher Uggen, & Jeff Manza, Ballot Manipulation and the “Menace of Negro Domination”:
Racial Threat and Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 1850–2002, 109 AM. J. SOC. 559, 591 (Nov. 2003).
55 Id. at 567 fig.1.
56 See Morgan McLeod, Expanding the Vote: Two Decades of Felony Disenfranchisement Reform, The Sentencing
Project,
3,
at
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/expanding-vote-two-decades-felonydisenfranchisement-reforms/.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 See MANZA & UGGEN, supra note __, at 10. The estimated number peaked at 6.1 million in 2016. Id.
60 481 U.S. 24 (1974).
61 See U.S. CONST. amend. 14, § 2.
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The Court, in a 6-3 decision written by then-Associate Justice William Rehnquist, was
persuaded by the claim that “those who framed and adopted the Fourteenth Amendment
could not have intended to prohibit outright in § 1 of that Amendment that which was
expressly exempted from the lesser sanction of reduced representation imposed by § 2 of the
Amendment.”62 And though state restrictions on the franchise typically receive heightened
review,63 the Court sidestepped this requirement because of Section 2’s “affirmative sanction”
permitting states to disenfranchise those with past convictions.64
Commentators have remarked on the oddity that the Fourteenth Amendment, which
was intended to expand voting privileges, formed the legal basis for limiting voting rights for
people with past felony convictions.65 While Section 2 is largely viewed as a dead letter,66 in
Richardson, it proved dispositive.
Subsequent challenges to felony disenfranchisement laws have likewise met with
limited success. These challenges again typically involve alleged violations of the Equal
Protection Clause, as well as the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965.67 No court has ever
completely invalidated a state’s decision to disenfranchise people with past felony
convictions.68
A second major development that blunted the impact of relaxed felony
disenfranchisement laws is the concurrent rise of mass incarceration in the United States.
The per capita imprisonment rate slowly started to increase in the 1970s, but accelerated
steeply throughout the 1980s and 1990s.69 By 2010, the prison rate in the United States was
five times what it was in 1970, increasing from about 100 to 502 people imprisoned per
100,000 residents.70 And there were gross racial disparities in this increase: a Black man born
in the 1960s who did not have a high school degree had a 60-70% chance of experiencing

62

See Ramirez, 481 U.S. at 31.

63 See id. at 48 (citing cases listing that restrictions on franchise generally must show “compelling state interest”).
64

Id. at 48.

65 See e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, Felon Disenfranchisement, and the Right to Vote: Did the Fifteenth Amendment

Repeal Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 92 GEO. L.J. 259 (2004); see also Note, Revisiting Richardson v.
Ramirez: The Constitutional Bounds of Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement, 70 ALA. L. REV. 259 (2018); Abigail M.
Hinchcliff, The Other Side of Richardson v. Ramirez: A Textual Challenge to Felon Disenfranchisement, 121 YALE L.J.
194 (2011); Richard W. Bourne, Richardson v. Ramirez: A Motion to Reconsider, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 1 (2007);
Pamela S. Karlan, Ballots and Bullets: The Exceptional History of the Right to Vote, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1345 (2003).
66 See Chin, supra note __, at __ (arguing that “Section 2 was a dead letter before it became law”); see also George
David Zuckerman, A Consideration of the History and Present Status of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 30
FORDHAM L. REV. 93 (1961) (discussing whether Section 2 retained vitality).
67 See, e.g., Christina Beeler, Felony Disenfranchisement Laws: Paying and Re-Paying a Debt to Society , 21 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1071, 1089 (2019) (“Although challenges to felony disenfranchisement laws under the Equal Protection
Clause have had more success than challenges under Section 2 of the VRA, the Equal Protection Clause is still
an ineffective tool for challenging most felony disenfranchisement laws because it requires proof of intentional
racial discrimination, which is notoriously difficult to prove.”).
68 See MANZA & UGGEN, supra note __, at 53. A rare exception is Hunter v. Underwood, when the U.S. Supreme
Court unanimously struck down an Alabama disenfranchisement law that had been adopted in a 1901
constitutional convention to further a racially discriminatory intent. 471 U.S. 222 (1985). The Court distinguished
Ramirez, noting “we are confident that § 2 was not designed to permit the purposeful racial discrimination
attending the enactment and operation of [a law] which otherwise violates section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Id.
69 See MANZA & UGGEN, supra note __, at 124.
70 See SARAH WAKEFIELD & CHRISTOPHER WILDEMAN, CHILDREN OF THE PRISON BOOM: MASS
INCARCERATION AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN INEQUALITY 13-14 (Oxford Univ. Press. 2014).
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imprisonment by his early thirties (as compared to 11% for a similarly situated White man).71
Today, the United States imprisons more people than any other nation.
While the increase in incarceration rates is correlated with the so-called War on
Drugs, it is not correlated with corresponding measurable increases in violent criminal activity
or property crime during this time. Rather, “crime rates . . . trended downward, rather than
upward, in the United States [between 1976 and 2006].”72 What changed is the “likelihood
that an arrest will lead to a conviction . . . increased significantly, and convicted felons are
now serving a significantly greater portion of their sentences prior to release.”73

C.

“User” Fees and Felony Financial Disenfranchisement

The third major development that has driven voter disenfranchisement — and a primary focus
of this Article — is the rise of legal-financial obligations. LFOs typically stem from one of
three categories: fines, restitution, and fees (also known as court costs). Fines are intended to
serve as a form of punishment, often as an alternative to incarceration, to deter future criminal
conduct. They are awarded in only a minority of cases.74 Restitution involves payments that
are typically made directly to the victim of a crime; its purpose is more closely related to
restorative justice — to make a victim whole again.75
Fee assessments, also called “user fees,” are different. These are not imposed to make
a victim whole or to punish future conduct. Rather, the goal of user fees is to shift some of
the cost of the criminal legal system onto the defendants who pass through it.76
Most states charge user fees to fund their courts. This practice has greatly expanded
in scope over the past few decades.77 For example, a survey conducted by NPR and the
Brennan Center for Justice found that between 2010 and 2014, 48 states increased criminal
and civil court fees.78 In at least 43 states, defendants can be charged for having a public
defender79 — a practice that would seem to be in at least some tension with the constitutional
mandate that a felony defendant should be provided counsel when they are indigent.80

71 See WAKEFIELD & WILDEMAN, supra note __, at 13-15 (citing Becky Petit & Bruce Western, Mass Imprisonment
and the Life Course: Race and Class Inequality in U.S. Incarceration, 69 AM. SOCIO. REV. 151 (2004) and Bruce
Western & Christopher Wildeman, The Black Family and Mass Incarceration, 621 ANN. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.
221 (2009)).
72 MANZA & UGGEN, supra note __, at 126 (emphasis in original).
73 Id. at 127 (emphasis in original).
74 Jones v. DeSantis, 420 F. Supp, 3d (N.D. Fla. 2020).
75 Id. (noting that restitution payments are occasionally made through the Clerk of Court or Department of
Corrections, which charge administrative fees for handling these payments).
76 See Ariel Jurow Kleiman, Nonmarket Criminal Justice Fees, 72 HASTINGS L.J. 517, 519 (2021); see also Beth A.
Colgan, Wealth-based Penal Disenfranchisement, 72 VAND. L. REV. 55 (2019); Thea Sebastian, Danielle Lang,
& Caren E. Short, Democracy, if You Can Afford It: How Financial Conditions Are Undermining the Right to Vote, 4
UCLA CRIM. JUST. L. REV. 79 (2020); Caitlin Croley, Punishment Only for the Poor: The Unconstitutionality of Payto-Vote Disenfranchisement Laws, 71 EMORY L.J. 371 (2021).
77 See id. at 526 (noting proliferation of criminal justice fees in the 1970s and 1980s).
78 See Joseph Shapiro, Supreme Court Ruling Not Enough To Prevent Debtors Prisons, National Public Radio (May 21,
2014), available at https://www.npr.org/2014/05/21/313118629/supreme-court-ruling-not-enough-to-preventdebtors-prisons.
79 See Shapiro, supra note __.
80 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See also Nicolas Sawyer, Note, Too Poor to Vote: Felony
Disenfranchisement in Florida Violates Bearden, 25 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 205 (2020) (arguing that Florida’s felony
disenfranchisement regime is unconstitutional because it disparately impacts indigent people).
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This process often results in a complicated patchwork of fee provisions. For example,
as of 2017, California had created 269 different categories of fines, fees, forfeitures, surcharges
and penalty assessments.81 And the State of New York has laws requiring “10 mandatory
surcharges, 19 fees, and six civil penalties ranging from $5 to $750.
In addition, Florida employs fee assessments perhaps more than any other state, with
increasing prevalence in recent decades. In 1998, voters amended the Florida Constitution to
shift funding of the Florida court system from the county government to a fee-based system.
The amendment provided:
All funding for the offices of the clerks of the circuit and county courts
performing court-related functions, except as otherwise provided . . . shall be
provided by adequate and appropriate filing fees for judicial proceedings and
service charges and costs for performing court-related functions as required by
general law. Selected salaries, costs, and expenses of the state courts system
may be funded from appropriate filing fees for judicial proceedings and service
charges and costs for performing court-related functions, as provided by
general law.82
A 2010 study by the Brennan Center for Justice found the Florida state legislature authorized
more than 20 new categories of fees between 1996 and 2009.83 To illustrate but a few
examples: in 1996, the state legislature authorized a $40 application fee for public defender
(increased to $50 in 2008); in 1998, it authorized a $20 “crime stoppers” fund surcharge; and
in 2004, it increased the maximum surcharge for reinstatement of a driver’s license from
$37.50 to $47.50 (later increased to $60 in 2009).84
In addition to fees assessed at the time of conviction, fees are often assessed after
conviction. In Florida, the most commonly assessed post-conviction fees are interest on
amounts owed and collection agency fees, which are capped at 40% of the amount owed.85

D.

Voter Disenfranchisement in Florida

1. Background. — Voter disenfranchisement in Florida shares a historical tradition with the
rest of the country. Under its original constitution, the General Assembly passed legislation
that barred from suffrage those who committed crimes that demonstrated immoral character;
explicitly, the electorate excluded “all persons convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery, or other
high crime, or misdemeanor.”86

81

Karin D. Martin, Sandra Susan Smith and Wendy Still, Shackled to Debt: Criminal Justice Financial Obligations
and the Barriers to Re-Entry They Create, 4 NEW THINKING IN COMM. CORR.(Jan. 2017), available at
https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/249976.pdf.
82 FLA. CONST. art. V, § 14 (amended 1998)
83 Rebekah Diller, Brennan Center for Justice, The Hidden Costs of Florida’s Criminal Justice Fees (2010), at
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_The%20Hidden-Costs-Florida%27sCriminal-Justice-Fees.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2022). Clerks of court in Florida have no control over what fees
are charged, even though the fees are supposed to be used to fund their operations. See Office of Program Policy
Analysis and Government Accountability, Assessment, Collection, and Distribution of Fines and Fees in Criminal Cases,
Report No. 19-14 (Nov. 2019), at https://perma.cc/5YT3-W4C7.
84 Diller, supra note __, at 6.
85 See Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2004-265 (C.S.C.S.S.B. 2962).
86 See Allison J. Riggs, Felony Disenfranchisement in Florida: Past, Present and Future, 28 J. CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV.
107 (2015) (citing FLA. CONST. art. VI, §§ 4, 13 (amended 1868)).
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Like its Southern brethren, Florida expanded its voter restrictions following the Civil
War. At a constitutional convention in 1868, delegates drafted a document that limited
representation in predominantly Black counties; White supremacists such as W.J. Purman
openly celebrated the legalized suppression of racial equality.87 The new constitution also
included a provision that disenfranchised “any person convicted of a felony…unless restored
to civil rights.”88 Hence, felony convictions automatically stripped individuals of voting
privileges but for a restoration process through the Florida Executive Clemency Board; this
channel continues to serve returning citizens to varying degrees of success.89 To benefit from
this process, a formerly convicted individual must submit an application demonstrating their
case before the governor and their cabinet.90 Approval of at least two cabinet members and
the governor are required; the governor reserves the right to veto any application.91
While interest in civil rights restoration gained momentum and manifested itself into
legislative reform throughout much of the country,92 Florida’s voter laws remained virtually
stagnant. The only vehicle of mass re-enfranchisement laid with the Florida Executive
Clemency Board. Between 2007 and 2011, Governor Charlie Crist restored voting rights for
tens of thousands.93 However, his successor, Rick Scott, ceased the practice and instituted a
mandatory moratorium between release from supervision and eligibility for clemency.94 In
recent years, few returning citizens have benefited from the process.95
2. Amendment 4 and S.B.7066. — In spite of Governor Crist’s efforts, over 1.5 million
individuals with criminal histories remained disenfranchised.96 This magnitude had captured

87

See Mary Ellen Klas, Florida Has a History of Making It Harder for Black Citizens to Vote, Miami Herald (August
13, 2016) at https://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/election/article95105602.html
88 See Riggs, supra note __, at __ (citing FLA. CONST. art. VI, §§ 2, 4 (amended 1968)). The provision related to
disenfranchisement was not amended in Florida’s 1861 and 1865 Constitutions. See id.
89 See infra notes __ and accompanying text; see also Joshua H. Winograd, Let the Sunshine in: Floridian Felons and
the Franchise, 31 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 267 (2021) (detailing history of felon disenfranchisement in Florida
and Amendment 4 litigation).
90 FLA. CONST. art. IV § 4 (The Governor’s cabinet consists of the Attorney General, the Chief Financial
Officer, and the Commissioner of Agriculture).
91 See Rules of Executive Clemency at https://www.fcor.state.fl.us/docs/clemency/clemency_rules.pdf
92 Morgan McLeod, Sentencing Project, Expanding the Vote: Two Decades of Felony Disenfranchisement Reform
(2018), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Expanding-the-Vote-1997-2018.pdf
93 See Hand v. Scott, 285 F. Supp. 3d 1289, 1310 (N.D. Fla. 2018), vacated and remanded sub nom. Hand v. DeSantis,
946 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2020).
94 See Restoration of Civil Rights Search, Office of Executive Clemency Florida Commission on Offender Review
https://fpcweb.fcor.state.fl.us
95 See Statement by Commissioner Nikki Fried on Florida Clemency Board Meeting, Florida Department of Agricultural
and Consumer Services (September 23, 2020) at https://www.fdacs.gov/News-Events/Press-Releases/2020-PressReleases/Statement-by-Commissioner-Nikki-Fried-on-Florida-Clemency-Board-Meeting. Several scholars
argued that the pre-Amendment 4 Florida disenfranchisement laws violated either federal statutory or
constitutional provisions. See, e.g., Caitlin Shay & Zachary Zarnow, Free but No Liberty: How Florida Contravenes
the Voting Rights Act with Disenfranchisement of Felons, 69 NAT’L LAW. GUILD REV. 1 (2012); Katherine Shaw,
Invoking the Penalty: How Florida's Felon Disenfranchisement Law Violates the Constitutional Requirement of Population
Equality in Congressional Representation, and What to Do about It, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1439 (2006); Guy Stuart,
Databases, Felons, and Voting: Bias and Partisanship of the Florida Felons List in the 2000 Elections, 119 POL. SCI. Q. 453
(2004) (analyzing Florida’s attempt to disenfranchise all people with past felony convictions from voting prior
to the 2000 election).
96 See Morgan McLeod, Sentencing Project, Expanding the Vote: Two Decades of Felony Disenfranchisement Reform
(2018), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Expanding-the-Vote-1997-2018.pdf
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national attention for almost a decade.97 Legislative bills failed to usher in any reform.98 This
spurred a grassroots organization, the Florida Rights Restoration Coalition (FRRC), to
pursue change through a ballot initiative.99 With the backing of organizations such as the
ACLU, the Brennan Center for Justice, Faith in Action, and Tides Advocacy, FRRC —
spearheaded by Desmond Meade — led a non-partisan campaign that crafted what eventually
became known as Amendment 4.100 The campaign marketed itself as a colorblind movement
based on redemption and dignity.101
The message appealed to a diverse swath of Floridians,102 who overwhelmingly
affirmed103 the initiative that reads:
(a) No person convicted of a felony, or adjudicated in this or any other state to
be mentally incompetent, shall be qualified to vote or hold office until
restoration of civil rights or removal of disability. Except as provided in
subsection (b) of this section, any disqualification from voting arising from a
felony conviction shall terminate and voting rights shall be restored upon
completion of all terms of sentence including parole or probation.
(b) No person convicted of murder or a felony sexual offense shall be qualified
to vote until restoration of civil rights.104
While advocates of reform celebrated Amendment 4,105 political machinations poised to
undermine the initiative’s scope existed even before its passage. The principal limitation
stems from the phrase, “completion of all terms of sentence including parole or probation.”106
The vague language — which conveniently circumvented uncomfortable conversations about
what explicitly compose sentence terms — served as fodder for critics. Several officials107

97 See Jeff Manza & Christopher Uggen, Locked Out: Felon Disenfranchisement and American Democracy 275
tbl.A8.1 (2008).
98 See, e.g., Expert Report of J. Morgan Kousser, Ph.D. at app. 114 tbl.7, Jones v. DeSantis, 462 F. Supp. 1196
(No. 4:19-cv-300), 2020 WL 3130149.
99 See DESMOND MEADE, LET MY PEOPLE VOTE: MY BATTLE TO RESTORE THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF RETURNING
CITIZENS (2020), 57-62.
100 See Morse, supra note __, at 1153 fig.1, 1154 fig.2 (documenting donors to FRRC; more generally, see this article
for a fuller discussion of the campaign’s history).
101 See, e.g., Press Release, Second Chances Florida, Freedom Partners Chamber of Commerce Endorses
Amendment 4.
102 See Morse, supra note __, at 1170 fig.6, 1171 fig.7 (documenting support among Black and poor White
communities).
103 See e.g., Tim Mark, Over 1 Million Florida Felons Win Right To Vote With Amendment 4, NPR (November 17,
2018) at https://www.npr.org/2018/11/07/665031366/over-a-million-florida-ex-felons-win-right-to-vote-withamendment-4
104 Constitutional Amendment Petition Form for Voting Restoration Amendment, FLA. DEP’T OF STATE, DIV.
OF ELECTIONS (Oct. 31, 2014), https://dos.elections.myflorida.com/initiatives/fulltext/pdf/64388-1.pdf.
105 See, e.g., Jennifer Rae Taylor, Florida’s Election Shows the True Promise of Restoring Voting Rights, The Marshall
Project (November 7, 2018) at https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/11/07/florida-s-election-showsthe-true-promise-of-restoring-voting-rights.
106 FLA. CONST. amend. 4.
107 See Blaise Gainey, Grant Defends Constitutionality Of Felon Voting Rights Amendment, WFSU (August 23, 2019)
at
https://news.wfsu.org/state-news/2019-08-23/grant-defends-constitutionality-of-felon-voting-rightsamendment.
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argued the language always intended to incorporate criminal court assessments associated
with the conviction, as affirmed by the campaign’s attorney Jon L. Mills108 and its partners.109
The artful language of the initiative potentially stems from strategic decision-making
by advocates and opponents. The supermajority behind Amendment 4 relied heavily on a
bipartisan coalition;110 that partnership may have crumbled had the campaign been more
transparent about sentence terms, especially given the sensitivity of many to anything
remotely resembling a poll tax.111 The campaign may have also hoped the lack of systematic
data on criminal court debt would prevent their inclusion.112 Regardless of intent, these
choices engendered an air of confusion among its intended beneficiaries.113
The same cultural awareness may have initially prevented formation of organized
opposition or vocal critics.114 Even those openly against Amendment 4, including then
Governor-elect Ron DeSantis,115 remained relatively silent on the specifics of the issue.
However, the policy space surrounding the ambiguous phrase “terms of sentence[s]”
eventually yielded outright political opposition. Some elected officials believed that
incorporation of LFOs upheld the vision presented to voters.116 Accordingly, the electorate,
moved by a narrative that emphasized redemption and dignity, demanded that criminal court
debt tied to sentences be settled in order to restore victims and, thus, regain eligibility.117

108 Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. Re: Voting Restoration Amend., 215 So. 3d
1202 (Fla. 2017) (Nos. 16-1785, 16-1981) https://wfsu.org/gavel2gavel/transcript/pdfs/16-1785_16-1981.pdf
109 See ACLU, FRRC, LatinoJustice PRLDEF, The League of Women Voters, Re: Implementation of Amendment
4, the Voting Restoration Amendment (December 13, 2018) at https://www.aclufl.org/sites/default/files/guidance_
letter_to_secretary_of_state_regarding_a4_implementation.pdf
110 See Morse, supra note __, at 1170 fig.6, 1171 fig.7 (documenting support among Black and poor White
communities).
111 See, e.g., Daniel B. Jones, Werner Troesken & Randall Walsh, A Poll Tax by any Other Name: The Political
Economy of Disenfranchisement, NBER Working Paper (December 2012)
112 See Memorandum from Howard Simon, Exec. Dir., ACLU Fla., and Marc Mauer, Exec. Dir., Sentencing
Project, to Exec. Bd., Second Chances Team (Feb. 11, 2018).
113 See Lawrence Mower and Langston Taylor, Miami Herald and Tampa Bay Times, In Florida, the Gutting of a
Landmark Law Leaves Few Felons Likely to Vote (October 7, 2020) at https://www.propublica.org/article/in-floridathe-gutting-of-a-landmark-law-leaves-few-felons-likely-to-vote (“Nancy Abudu, deputy legal director for voting
rights at the Southern Poverty Law Center in Montgomery, Alabama, said she is advising anyone who is
uncertain about whether they owe money to avoid voting next month.”)
114 See Morse, supra note __.
115 See German Lopez, One in 10 potential Florida Voters Can’t Legally Vote. Amendment 4 Could Change That, Vox
(November 6, 2018) at https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/10/17/17978502/florida-amendment-4felons-vote-disenfranchisement.
116 FLA. CONST. Art. I, Sec. 16. As the sponsor of S.B.7066 noted in defense of the bill, “Voters made it crystal
clear victims have the right to receive restitution.” Gray Rohrer and Skyler Swisher, Florida Lawmakers Pass
Amendment 4 Restrictions on Ex-Felon Voting Rights as Democrats Fume on Wild Day, Orlando Sentinel,
https://www.orlandosentinel.com/politics/os-ne-florida-legislature-session-friday-20190503-story.html.
117 See Jones, 975 F.3d at 1036 (noting that the state argued that a LFO satisfaction requirement ensures that
eligibility applies to “...only those felons who have paid their debt to society and been fully rehabilitated”).
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Others who argued sentence terms encompass LFOs were lured by potential inflows from
their inclusion118 or political hegemony from the subsequent disenfranchisement.119
Ultimately, the political forces fomented Senate Bill 7066 (S.B.7066), which instituted
Amendment 4 with explicit sentence terms.120 That clarifying language reads:
(2)(a) “Completion of all terms of sentence” means any portion of
a sentence that is contained in the four corners of the sentencing
document, including but not limited to:
…
5.a. Full payment of restitution order to a victim by the court as a
part of the sentence…
b. Full payment of fines or fees ordered by the court as a part of
the sentence or that are ordered by the court as a condition of any
form of supervision…121
The bill prompted criticism from the Amendment 4 campaign and proponents; they argued
the bill could not be enforced given Florida’s inability to inform returning citizens of
eligibility and violated constitutionally enshrined privileges.122
3. Litigation. — On June 28, 2019 the ACLU, New York University’s Brennan Center
and the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund filed suit in the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Florida on behalf of various named plaintiffs.123 There they alleged,
among other things, that S.B.7066 violated the 14th Amendment, 15th Amendment and 24th
Amendment by instituting what amounted to a poll tax.124 The district court granted a
preliminary injunction, (affirmed on appeal by a panel of the Eleventh Circuit)125 that

118

See Daniel Rivero, Co-Author And Attorney For Florida's Amendment 4 Helped Create Statewide Fines And Fees
Policy, WLRN Miami at https://www.wlrn.org/news/2019-03-27/co-author-and-attorney-for-floridasamendment-4helped-create-statewide-fines-and-fees-policy (Justice Barbara Pariente, long known as one of the most liberal
justices on the bench, explicitly connected the need to pay fines to the right to vote in the 2018 hearing. “This
would actually help the state because if fines, costs and restitution are a requirement, for those that want to
vote, there’s a big motivation to pay unpaid costs, fines and restitution…”).
119 See, e.g., Nate Cohn, A ‘Blue Florida’? There Are No Quick Demographic Fixes for Democrats, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/01/upshot/a-blue-florida-there-are-no-quick-demographic-fixes-fordemocrats.html.
120 Florida has a history of overturning ballot initiatives with subsequent legislation. See Case Comment, Eleventh
Circuit Upholds Statute Limiting Constitutional Amendment on Felon Reenfranchisement. — Jones v. Governor of
Florida, 975 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 2020), 134 HARV. L. REV. 2291, 2291 (2021) (noting how the Florida legislature
overturned prior separate ballot initiatives that sought to regulate polluters in the Everglades, and legalize
medical marijuana).
121 S.B. 7066, 2019 Leg. (Fla. 2019).
122 See, e.g., Brennan Center for Justice, Litigation to Protect Amendment 4 in Florida, (September 11, 2020)
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/court-cases/litigation-protect-amendment-4-florida;
see
also
Winograd, supra note __; Dalia Figueredo, Comment, Affording the Franchise: Amendment 4 & the Senate Bill 7066
Litigation, 72 FLA. L. REV. 1135 (2020) (exploring “prior legal challenges to financially discriminatory reenfranchisement schemes and the ongoing litigation over Amendment 4 and S.B.7066.”)
123 Complaint, 1:19-cv-00121-MW-GRJ (June 28, 2019).
124 Complaint, 1:19-cv-00121-MW-GRJ at 53-60 (June 28, 2019).
125 Jones v. DeSantis, 950 F.3d 795 (11th Cir. 2020).
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permitted the plaintiffs named in the suit to vote without paying any outstanding criminal
assessments.126
After an eight-day trial beginning on April 27, 2020, the district court found that
Florida’s “pay-to-vote” system was akin to a tax that was unconstitutional as applied to people
who are unable to pay, and also with respect to “amounts that are unknown and cannot be
determined with diligence.”127 The court granted a permanent injunction,128 which was
immediately appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.
The Defendants filed a petition with the Eleventh Circuit seeking an en banc hearing.
On July 1 2020, the Eleventh Circuit voted to grant that petition and to stay the permanent
injunction until it decided the case on the merits.129 Plaintiffs filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari with the Supreme Court seeking to reinstitute the stay. On July 16, 2020, this writ
was denied without an opinion, though Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justices Ruth
Bader Ginsburg and Elena Kagan, filed a dissent.130
On September 11, 2020, the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc overturned the trial court
decision and held that S.B.7066 did not violate the Equal Protection Clause or the 24th
Amendment.131 As such, S.B.7066 remained in force during the 2020 election; LFO repayment
was a prerequisite for most returning citizens to be able to exercise voting privileges.

III. THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF FELONY FINANCIAL
DISENFRANCHISEMENT
Despite the growth of criminal legal-financial obligations over the past fifty years, their actual
impact on the voting behavior of returning citizens remains an open question. The prior
empirical literature on voting has not specifically focused on the phenomenon of FFD.132
Presumably, the sparsity of high quality, individual-level data on LFOs is the primary reason
for this dearth of empirical research.
Instead, researchers have studied the impact of felony disenfranchisement writ large.
We begin with an overview of this literature, which is equivocal in its findings. We then
discuss two specific channels by which FFD might impact voter turnout: a direct impact akin
to a poll tax, and an indirect impact through increased uncertainty and a chilling effect. Along
the way we provide theoretical and empirical evidence supporting these mechanisms from
analogous contexts in social science research.

126 Order Denying the Motion to Dismiss or Abstain and Granting a Preliminary Injunction, 1:19-cv-00121MW-GRJ (Oct. 18, 2019).
127 Opinion on the Merits, 1:19-cv-00121-MW-GRJ, at 118 (May 24, 2020). The system was found to be “not
unconstitutional as applied to those who are able to pay.” Id.
128 Id. at 118-25.
129 McCoy v. Governor of Fla., No. 20-12003-AA, 2020 WL 4012843 (11th Cir. July 1, 2020). This decision was a
mere 19 days before the voter-registration deadline for the primary election to be held in August 2020. See Raysor
v. DeSantis, 140 S. Ct. 2600, 207 L. Ed. 2d 1120 (2020).
130 Raysor v. DeSantis, 140 S. Ct. 2600, 207 L. Ed. 2d 1120 (2020).
131 Opinion 4:19-cv-00300-RH-MJF (September 11, 2020).
132 One exception is Marc Meredith & Michael Morse, Discretionary Disenfranchisement: The Case of Legal Financial
Obligations, 46 J. LEG. STUD. 309 (2017). That study describes LFOs in Alabama but does not link these data at
the individual level to subsequent voting behavior.
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Prior Empirical Literature

While the impact of FFD remains unstudied, empirical scholars have studied felony
disenfranchisement more generally and found that it might have a significant effect on voter
turnout and election outcomes. Most notably, Jeff Manza and Christopher Uggen have
argued that felony disenfranchisement laws likely played a dispositive role in a number of U.S.
Senate elections as well as the 2000 presidential election between Texas Governor George
W. Bush and Vice-President Al Gore.133 Their paper simulates these counterfactual scenarios
by either removing or imposing disenfranchisement restrictions for different elections and
predicting returning citizen turnout and party preference based on demographic data.134
By contrast, other empirical analyses have suggested that felony disenfranchisement
has a minimal impact on voter turnout. For example, Professor Tom Miles used a tripledifferences regression framework to study whether felony disenfranchisement laws
disparately affect Black voter turnout. He finds that “the presence of a law permanently
disenfranchising ex-felons has no effect on the state-level turnout rates of African-American
men relative to those of whites and females.”135 More recently, Kevin Morris showed that
Floridians living in households with people formerly incarcerated did not turnout at higher
rates in 2018, when Amendment 4 was on the ballot, relative to other voters.136 The author
argues this implies that ending felon disenfranchisement, absent more significant investment
and engagement, is unlikely to significantly increase electoral participation rates of returning
citizens.137
Other empirical evidence also suggests that people with past felony convictions vote
at lower rates than the population at large even after voting rights have been restored. For
example, Michael Haselswerdt uses data from New York to find that returning citizens
eligible to register and vote in certain years had single-digit turnout rates.138 Similarly, Randi
Hjalmarsson and Mark Lopez look at two nationally representative surveys that include
formerly incarcerated individuals; they find that returning citizens are 31 percentage points
less likely to vote than never-incarcerated individuals.139
133 Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? Political Consequences of Felon Disenfranchisement in the

United States, 67 AM. SOCIO. REV. 777 (2002) (further noting that “at least one Democratic presidential victory
[John F. Kennedy’s 1960 win] would have been jeopardized had contemporary rates of disenfranchisement
prevailed during that time”); see also MANZA & UGGEN, supra note __; Antoine Yoshinaka and Christian R.
Grose. Partisan Politics and Electoral Design: The Enfranchisement of Felons and Ex-Felons in the United States, 1960-99.
37 ST. & LOC. GOV. REV. 49 (2005) (noting that voter turnout in states that permanently disenfranchise people
with past felony convictions is lower than in states that do not in a cross-state comparison amongst southern
states).
134 See Uggen & Manza, supra note __, at __.
135 See Thomas J. Miles, Felon Disenfranchisement and Voter Turnout, 33 J. LEG. STUD. 85, 122 (2004).
136 Kevin Morris, Turnout and Amendment Four: Mobilizing Eligible Voters Close to Formerly Incarcerated Floridians,
115 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 805, 812 (2021).
137 See id. But see Kevin Morris, Welcome Home — Now Vote! Voting Rights Restoration and Post-Supervision
Participation,
Working
Paper
(Apr.
8.
2020),
at
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/341576052_Welcome_Home_Now_Vote_Voting_Rights_Restoration_and_Post-Supervision_Participation (finding that restoring voting
privileges to parolees in New York increased their voter turnout, based on causal analysis that leveraged
randomness in parole discharge date).
138 See Michael V. Haselswerdt, Con Job: An Estimate of Ex-Felon Voter Turnout Using Document-Based Data. 90 SOC.
SCI. Q. 262, 268 (2009).
139 See Randi Hjalmarsson & Mark Lopez, Voting Behavior of Young Disenfranchised Felons: Would They Vote if they
Could, 19 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 356 (2010); see also Traci Burch, Turnout and Party Registration among Criminal
Offenders in the 2008 General Election, 45 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 699 (2011) (estimating registration and turnout for
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B. Priced Out: FFD as a Poll Tax
Having laid out the general empirical literature on felony disenfranchisement to-date, we turn
to FFD and the novel ways it might affect voter behavior. Analysis of this issue requires a
cursory understanding of why people vote in the first place, a topic of considerable study in
political science.140
The workhorse rational choice model for voting has a simple but compelling answer:
a prospective voter will vote only if the benefits associated with voting exceed the costs of
voting.141 While theoretical models have become more sophisticated, the cost of participation
remains a prominent determinant in the calculus of voting.142 Hence, crucial to whether a
person votes are the costs that voting might entail.
Perhaps the most straightforward costs to consider are monetary. In the Amendment
4 litigation, the challengers to S.B.7066 alleged that conditioning voter restoration on LFO
obligations was akin to a poll tax. The district court agreed with the challengers,143 though
the legal argument was ultimately unsuccessful on appeal. Still, from an economic standpoint,
LFOs operate exactly as a poll tax would; they augment the monetary cost associated with
the act of voting, and, on the margin, reduce an individual’s propensity to vote. This results
in reduced aggregate turnout.
As background, by the early twentieth century, poll taxes were required to register to
vote in all eleven Southern states.144 They ranged from $1-$2, and were due up to nine months
in advance of the election in three states.145 Undoubtedly introduced to primarily
disenfranchise Black voters, states often neglected to inform Black citizens and people
without property that the tax was due. Naturally, this barred such individuals from voting
upon arrival at the polls.146 And in most states, poll taxes, if unpaid, were allowed to
accumulate over time.147 The ratification of the 24th Amendment in 1964, the passage of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the 1966 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Harper v. Virginia

men with past felony convictions in Florida, Georgia, Michigan, Missouri, and North Carolina, and finding that
their turnout averaged 22.2%); Edward M. Burmila, Voter Turnout, Felon Disenfranchisement and Partisan Outcomes
in Presidential Elections, 1988–2012, 30 SOC. JUST. RSCH. 72 (2017) (comparing turnout, election outcome, and
felony disenfranchisement rates across states).
140 See , e.g., Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy, 65 J. POL. ECON., (2), 135–150
(1957); see also John Ferejohn & Morris Fiorina, The Paradox of Not Voting: A Decision Theoretic Analysis, 68 AM.
POL. SCI. REV., no. 2: 525–536 (1974) (applying the maximin regret model of decision-making to voting to show
that voting can be a rational choice even when the probability for a single individual to be pivotal is small);
Stephen Coate & Michael Conlin, A Group Rule-Utilitarian Approach to Voter Turnout: Theory and Evidence, 94
AM. ECON. REV., (5), 1476–1504 (2004) (using a group rule–utilitarian approach to understand voter turnout and
testing the model’s predictions using turnout data from Texas liquor referenda).
141 See Downs, supra note __.
142 See William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, A Theory of the Calculus of Voting, 62 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 25
(1968).
143 Jones v. DeSantis, 462 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1233 (N.D. Fla. 2020) (“If a state chose to fund its criminal-justice
system by assessing a $10 fee against every resident of the state, nobody would doubt it was a tax. Florida has
chosen to fund its criminal-justice system by assessing just such a fee, but to assess it not against all residents
but only against those who are alleged to have committed a criminal offense and are not exonerated.”).
144 See J. Morgan Kousser, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880-1910, 66, (1974).
145 See Raymond G. Lloyd, WHITE SUPREMACY IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ANALYSIS OF ITS HISTORICAL
BACKGROUND, WITH ESPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE POLL TAX, 62, (1952).
146 Id.
147 See Kousser, supra note 108, at 65.
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State Board of Elections148 had the combined effect of banning poll taxes in federal and state
elections going forward.
Given the similarities between LFOs and poll taxes, understanding the impact of poll
taxes on voter turnout might provide insight as to the tax effect of LFOs. John Filer, Lawrence
Kenny, and Rebecca Morton conducted such an empirical study, quantifying the effect of the
removal of the poll tax in the 1960s on voter participation. They concluded that the
imposition of a $1.99 poll tax lowered voter turnout by 13 percentage points, on average,149
and that much of the “substantial increase in non-white turnout since World War II” is
attributable “to the removal of various barriers to voting.”150A paper by Orley Ashenfelter and
Stanley Kelley, Jr., studying the determinants of political participation in presidential
elections found a remarkably similar effect of the poll tax on turnout — a $1 poll tax in 1960
reduced turnout by 7 percentage points.151

C.

Chilling the Franchise: FFD and Information Costs

While LFOs introduce monetary costs that plausibly deter returning citizens from voting,
direct costs are not the only possible means by which the presence of criminal court debt
disincentivizes participation. Conditioning eligibility upon satisfaction of LFOs might raise
the likelihood that a voter becomes uncertain as to their ability to vote. For example, legal
ambiguities related to outstanding criminal court debt — such as those associated with
Amendment 4 — potentially deter cautious members of the electorate with felony
convictions from submitting a ballot. The absence of certainty as to one’s eligibility
theoretically functions as an indirect cost that forestalls otherwise qualified voters from
electoral participation.
Put simply, an eligible returning citizen sensitive to additional criminal sanctions could
guarantee they avoid costly errors by forgoing the use of their voting privileges. Such an
individual, in economics parlance, is risk-averse; as such, even a small risk of felony conviction
from voting likely exceeds the perceived benefits.
To be sure, voter fraud statutes, like other fraud statutes, are limited to those who
register to vote or cast a ballot despite knowingly and willfully being aware they are not eligible
148

383 U.S. 663 (1966).
See John E. Filer, Lawrence W. Kenny & Rebecca B. Morton, Voting Laws, Educational Policies, and Minority
Turnout, 34 J.L. & ECON. 371, 377 (1991).
150 Id. at 390-91. Other research has focused on how non-monetary costs might also deter voting. For example,
there is some evidence that rainfall — a factor that makes turning out to vote in-person costlier — negatively
affects overall turnout and differentially affects turnout by party affiliation. See Brad Gomez, Thomas Hansford
& George Krause, The Republicans Should Pray for Rain: Weather, Turnout, and Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections,
69 J. POL. 649 (2007). Similarly, distance to the polling location — another nonmonetary cost — plays a
significant role in determining turnout especially in high-minority voter areas. See Enrico Cantoni, A Precinct Too
Far: Turnout and Voting Costs, 12 AM. ECON. J. APP. ECON., No. 1, (2020). Based on a large-scale randomized
experiment in France, easing registration requirements increased turnout as well as voter interest and knowledge
about the political process. See Céline Braconnier, Jean-Yves Dormagen & Vincent Pons, Voter Registration Costs
and Disenfranchisement: Experimental Evidence from France, 111 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 584 (2017). Long wait times at
the polling place can lead to lower turnout due to discouraged voters or voters who abandon their place in the
line. See Robert Stein et al., Waiting to Vote in the 2016 Presidential Election: Evidence from a Multi-County Study, 73
POL. RES. Q. 439 (2019); see also David Cottrell, Michael C. Herron, & Daniel A. Smith, Voting Lines, Equal
Treatment, and Early Voting Check-in Times in Florida, 21 ST. POL. & POLICY. Q. 109 (2021); Hannah L. Walker,
Michael C. Herron, & Daniel A. Smith, Early Voting Changes and Voter Turnout: North Carolina in the 2016 General
Election, 41 POL. BEHAV. 841 (2019).
151 See Orley Ashenfelter & Stanley Kelley, Jr., Determinants of Participation in Presidential Elections, 18 J.L. & ECON.
708 (1975).
149
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to do so.152 Establishing such intent in court is typically not straightforward. But returning
citizens, generally not steeped in such nuances, might still be reasonably concerned about
potential misunderstandings. The mere possibility for an accidental oversight to be
misconstrued as deliberate by a prosecutor likely prevents many risk-averse individuals from
participating.
As noted in Section IV-A and further detailed in Section V, infra, Florida’s system for
calculating and communicating LFOs is perversely complicated. Therefore, it is plausible that
criminal assessments, barring substantial legal clarity and administrative adeptness, generate
uncertainty that deter otherwise-eligible returning citizens from exercising their electoral
privileges.
Importantly, Florida is not unique in its complexity and bureaucratic malaise; LFO
provisions in other states have long been singled out for their opacity and complexity as well.
Given potential miscalculations, many returning citizens may rationally choose to abstain
rather than submit themselves to risks.
Empirical research is currently silent on the extent to which assessments dissuade
participation. However, scholars have explored how other information costs and uncertainty
attenuate voter participation more generally.153 In a compelling study using administrative
data from Iowa, Marc Meredith and Michael Morse examine returning citizen turnout in
Iowa following an overhaul in their voting rights restoration process. They observe substantial
increases in participation following the switch from an application-based system to one with
automatic restoration of voting rights for those with past felony convictions in 2005.154 The
authors find that turnout rates are higher for those who were notified of the restoration of
their right to vote; this, naturally, reinforces the hypothesis that misinformation significantly
deters returning citizens’ political engagement.155
Other authors have instead turned to randomized-control trials (RCTs) to test the
importance of reducing information costs for returning citizens. Partnering with Connecticut
state officials, Gerber, Huber, Meredith, Biggers, and Hendry156 constructed an RCT in
152 See, e.g., Fl. Stat. § 104.011 (“(1) A person who willfully swears or affirms falsely to any oath or affirmation, or
willfully procures another person to swear or affirm falsely to an oath or affirmation, in connection with or
arising out of voting or elections commits a felony of the third degree . . .(2) A person who willfully submits any
false voter registration information commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or
s. 775.083. ) (emphasis added).
153 Political science research has investigated how voter information might affect turnout more generally. For
example, changes in polling places resulted in a 3% reduction in turnout in Los Angeles County during
California’s 2003 gubernatorial recall elections, 60% of which can be attributed to the search effect of voters
trying to find their new polling place. See, Henry Brady & John McNulty, Turning Out to Vote: The Costs of Finding
and Getting to the Polling Place, 105 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 115 (2011).
154 See Marc Meredith & Michael Morse, The Politics of the Restoration of Ex-Felon Voting Rights: The Case of Iowa,
10 Q.J. POL. SCI. 41 (2015).
155 See Meredith & Morse, supra note __, at __. The same authors previously published a different study that
measured the impact of notification laws in New York, North Carolina, and New Mexico, which required those
states to notify former defendants about the status of their voting rights. See Marc Meredith & Michael Morse,
Do Voting Rights Notification Laws Increase Ex-Felon Turnout?, 651 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 220, 222
(2014). They found “little evidence that notification increases registration and turnout rates” in these states,
though they noted this might be because the voting rights information “buried in densely worded pamphlets.”
Id. By contrast, the communication in Iowa involved sending short letters, personally addressed to the
dischargees, with language conveying that the state “wants him or her to vote.” Id.
156 See Alan S. Gerber, Gregory A. Huber, Marc Meredith, Daniel R. Biggers, and David J. Hendry, Can
Incarcerated Felons be (Re)integrated into the Political System Results from a Field Experiment, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 912
(2015) (building upon observational evidence that documented a negative correlation between past incarceration
status and voter participation).
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which they sent out mailers informing recently discharged inmates about voter eligibility.157
Control groups did not receive any mailers. The authors’ informational campaigns increased
registration by about 30% and turnout by approximately 25%.158
More recently, Doleac, Eckhouse, Foster-Moore, Harris, Walker, and White
conducted an RCT in North Carolina, but extended their population of interest to
incorporate unregistered voters who had been convicted of a felony at any time in the past.159
They find statistically significant effects of about 11-12%, for both voter registration and
turnout.
Hence, while no prior empirical studies have focused on reducing information costs
associated with criminal court debt, the existing body of research on informational
interventions suggests that uncertainty surrounding eligibility to vote significantly inhibits
returning citizens’ electoral involvement. Removal of uncertainty in the LFO context — such
as by notifying those returning citizens who do not owe court debt or for whom any remaining
assessments have been paid — might increase propensity to vote. These are precisely the types
of interventions that Free Our Vote conducted in Florida in 2020. We explore the efficacy
of those interventions in the next section.

IV. EMPIRICS: FELONY FINANCIAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT
IN FLORIDA
Here, we explain how Free Our Vote and its partners intervened on behalf of returning
citizens in Florida ahead of the 2020 general election. After explaining the underlying
problems with LFOs and introducing our approach, we use a variety of causal empirical
methodologies to analyze the impact of these interventions. Specifically, we draw on evidence
from standard multivariate regressions and quasi-random treatment frameworks.
We find that Free Our Vote’s informational campaign, which notified otherwise
eligible people who did not owe criminal assessments that they were qualified to vote, boosted
electoral participation by 16%. Free Our Vote’s debt relief campaign, which paid off criminal
assessments for individuals and thereby made them eligible to vote, increased electoral
turnout by 26%. Both results show the elimination of felony financial disenfranchisement
would significantly increase voter participation for returning citizens.

A. Confusion Over LFOs
Prior to the adoption of Amendment 4, the Florida Division of Elections implemented a fairly
simple approach to identify ineligible voters. Namely, it compared both members of and
registrants to the electorate against a list of individuals with felony convictions in Florida.
The algorithm required three of the following four fields to match perfectly: the applicant’s
full legal name, driver’s license number, social security number, and state identification

157 See Gerber et al., supra note __. In other treatment arms, the mailers also assuaged concerns about potential
penalties associated with voter fraud. Id. at. __.
158 See Gerber et al., supra note __.
159 See Jennifer L. Doleac, Laurel Eckhouse, Eric Foster-Moore, Allison Harris, Hannah Walker, & Ariel White,
Registering Returning Citizens to Vote, Working Paper (2021).
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number. Unless an individual received the blessing of the Florida Executive Clemency Board
or was convicted outside Florida, this process wholly determined eligibility.160
With the introduction of Amendment 4 and subsequent passage of S.B.7066, this once
prosaic method became byzantine. Now, the Division of Elections must screen applicants for
outstanding LFO balances.161
The process of determining criminal costs, fines, and fees is anything but
straightforward. No centralized repository of LFOs or state-mandated reporting standards
exist.162 Rather, each county uniquely tracks such debt; methods vary in terms of frequency
of updates and granularity. To obtain even primitive estimates, the Division of Elections must
apply a patchwork, county-specific process to systematically measure criminal case debt.163
Custodial and technological shortcomings mask balances such that even scholars familiar with
criminal data cannot state with certainty the true amount due.164
To illustrate, authorities might not be able to readily distinguish assessments tied to
criminal convictions versus those raised afterward. In certain jurisdictions, such as Pinellas
County, clerks’ offices meticulously note assessment and payment dates. This careful
delineation facilitates tabulation of balances for purposes of Amendment 4. Other, more
financially constrained counties might lack the means to monitor cases with the same
fastidiousness. In these jurisdictions, records are understandably cruder; assessments apart
from the original sentence are indistinguishable from the initial LFO. In practice, this
obfuscates the amount required to vote.
This limitation barely touches the tortuous lengths necessary to determine the amount
a returning citizen must pay to become re-enfranchised.165 Similar variations in reported
restitution balances, community service in lieu of payments, withheld adjudications,166 or
conversion to liens further complicate calculations.
Compound these problems with issues endemic to criminal records such as aliases,
name changes, or transcription errors, the logistics of clearing applicants with felony records
becomes more than troublesome. Director of the Division of Elections Maria Matthews
testified her office could review about 57 voters’ cases per day.167 A paucity of specialized legal
knowledge and technical skills partially explain the glacial speed; the Division of Elections
manually reviews cases, insensitive to the immediacy of upcoming elections. But even with
additional support that would cost taxpayers a minimum of $2.2 million, the state could not
feasibly provide rough estimates of outstanding debts for at least four to six years.168 If
160

Jones v. DeSantis, 420 F. Supp. 3d 1196 (N.D. Fla. 2020).
Id.
162 See Offender Based Transaction System (2002) (The one fully comprehensive case management system
implemented statewide, the Offender Based Tracking System, does not cover criminal fines and fees.)
163 See Dara Kam, A Top Florida Elections Official Gets Grilled on Felon Voting, TAMPA BAY TIMES (May 4, 2020),
https://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/buzz/2020/05/04/a-top-florida-elections-official-gets-grilled-onfelon-voting/
164 Jones v. DeSantis, 420 F. Supp. 3d 1196 (N.D. Fla. 2020).
165 See infra Section V-A.
166 Florida offers judges an option to “withhold adjudication” when sentencing a defendant. Such a sentence
means that a defendant was found guilty but was technically not deemed guilty by the judge, who believes the
defendant is unlikely to recidivate. See Fl. St. § 948.01(2). LFOs imposed in cases in which adjudication was
withheld on all counts do not trigger removal of civil rights, including voting; as such, we excluded such cases
from our analysis whenever it was possible to identify them using docket sheet data.
167 Jones v. DeSantis, 420 F. Supp. 3d 1196 (N.D. Fla. 2020).
168 Jones v. DeSantis, 420 F. Supp. 3d 1196 (N.D. Fla. 2020). (This calculation is based on six years of an estimated
additional twenty-one employees at the Division of Elections who each earn $16,000 annually. All figures but
161
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elections officials could not determine if an individual is eligible, those with convictions, who
generally lack administrative and legal expertise, cannot reasonably be expected to either.169

B. Free Our Vote
Regardless of the merits of Amendment 4 and S.B.7066, the resulting administrative
disarray appalled us; Florida’s inability to provide returning citizens with even a ballpark
estimate of their balances was morally if not constitutionally offensive. Fortunately, given our
prior experiences with Florida court, elections, and prison data,170 we knew estimates using
publicly available data sources were possible. Beyond that, it seemed apparent to us that a
technological solution could circumvent the bureaucratic inertia baked into the process
employed by the Florida Division of Elections. Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision
in July 2020 to not reinstitute the stay issued by the district court, we felt compelled to
intervene.171
In response, we launched a non-profit, non-partisan initiative called Free Our Vote.
Free Our Vote pools the talents of economists, law students, and data scientists to inform
individuals with felony backgrounds of any remaining LFO balances. Within three months
and with no budget, Free Our Vote collected accurate LFO data for nearly a half-million
Floridians; the data span over twenty-four counties that encompass more than 80% of the
state’s population. Figure 1 below describes our data coverage by county.

the salary — an extremely conservative input — come from the Director of the Division of Elections testimony.
It is worth noting that the responsibility of that inefficiency should not be borne by the Division of Elections.
Rather, it should be shouldered by advocates of S.B.7066; they failed to allocate funding to implement a
technologically sound, cost effective method to clear applicants with felony backgrounds.)
169 See Emily L. Mahoney, House passes Amendment 4 bill requiring felons to pay up before they can vote, MIAMI HERALD
(April 24, 2019) at https://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/article229619604.
html.
170 See, e.g., Scott Kostyshak & Neel U. Sukhatme, Down to the Last Strike: The Effect of the Jury Lottery on Criminal
Convictions, Working Paper, Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works 2156 (Apr. 2019) (analyzing
impact on case outcomes of variation in prospective jurors in felony and misdemeanor cases).
171 See Amy Gardner and Loria Rozsa, Supreme Court Deals Blow to Felons in Florida Seeking to Regain the Right to
Vote, Wash. Post (July 16, 2020) https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-deals-blow-to-felonsin-florida-seeking-to-regain-the-right-to-vote/2020/07/16/2ede827c-c5dd-11ea-a99f-3bbdffb1af38_story.html.
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Figure 1: Free Our Vote Data Availability by Florida County

The teal counties are where Free Our Vote acquired data either through web scraping techniques or data requests.
Green counties are where Free Our Vote did not obtain sufficient data to calculate outstanding LFOs.

Free Our Vote accomplished this by acquiring, cleaning, and merging data from many
sources. Specifically, we rely on data from the Florida Department of Corrections and the
Florida Department of Elections to sketch balances for all observed defendants. We also
pulled historical voter information, including registration dates and past participation, as well
as demographic features from the 2020 Department of Elections statewide voter file.
Leveraging these datasets in combination, we scraped felony assessment and payment records
directly from clerks’ websites; where jurisdictions prohibited the use of web-crawlers, we
requested the data directly from county clerks.
Using the coalesced data, Free Our Vote served returning citizens through three
distinct but related channels. First, Free Our Vote developed a clearinghouse website that
enables individuals to see if they qualify to vote.172 Based on the data we assembled, individuals
can query whether they appear to owe criminal court debt.
Second, Free Our Vote forged partnerships with other charitable entities seeking our
empirical insights to buttress their endeavors. Alongside organizations including the
Campaign Legal Center (CLC) and the Florida Rights Restoration Coalition (FRRC), we
contacted returning citizens with no outstanding balances to inform them of their eligibility;
for individuals not in the electorate, we also provided details about the registration process.
172

See Free Our Vote, at https://freeourvote.com.
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Third, Free Our Vote began a debt repayment program, actively designed to eliminate
court debt and restore voting privileges for otherwise eligible returning citizens. Because of
the attention on the upcoming election, the data’s value to donors became palpable.
Injections of cash to FRRC by high-profile figures such as Michael Bloomberg and LeBron
James altered the landscape we inhabited.173 FRRC conducts grassroots outreach to affected
individuals and engages county clerks on behalf of its clients. While it does collect some data,
those records detail balances for specific individuals it intends to serve rather than the
comprehensive universe of potential beneficiaries.
Free Our Vote supported some of FRRC’s efforts. Namely, we flagged individuals who
committed offenses that violate the terms of Amendment 4 and shared data that captured
accurate amounts owed for their beneficiaries.
Free Our Vote then expanded its own efforts through direct contact with donors. In
coordination with FRRC, we formed a collaboration with Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights
to raise funds to eliminate criminal assessments and re-enfranchise returning citizens voting
privileges. We focused our energies on counties where FRRC had a minimal footprint.

C. Measuring the Chilling Effect
1. Information Campaign. — Free Our Vote’s first intervention, which we refer to as the
“information campaign,” involved sending informative mailers and text messages to already
registered returning citizens that Free Our Vote had identified as not owing any LFOs. We
informed these otherwise eligible people that they did not seem to owe any LFOs and,
therefore, appeared to qualify under Amendment 4. Figure 2 below shows the mailer sent to
the first group, which conveys the above message.

173 See Michael Scherer, Mike Bloomberg Raises $16 Million to Allow Former Felons to Vote in Florida, WASH. POST
(Sept.
22,
2020)
at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/mike-bloomberg-raises-16-millionto-allow-former-felons-to-vote-in-florida/2020/09/21/6dda787e-fc5a-11ea-8d05-9beaaa91c71f_story.html.
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Figure 2: Mailers Sent to Information Campaign Recipients

Figure 3 shows two sides of a mailer sent to eligible voters with felony convictions but no LFO balances.

Measuring the impact of any intervention requires having a control group — a set of
people who did not receive the treatment; in this case, the informative mailer or text message
functions as the treatment or intervention. An ideal control group consists of people who are
virtually identical to those in the treatment group, except they were not contacted for reasons
unrelated to their propensity to vote. Accordingly, any average difference we measure in
electoral turnout between the treatment and control groups would be attributable to the
treatment. No other non-treatment-related difference between the two groups could explain
differences in electoral participation.
Here, our control group consists of people who are observationally similar to the ones
that Free Our Vote contacted but who Free Our Vote did not contact simply due to data
anomalies or logistical reasons. While Free Our Vote engaged in an extensive effort to
accurately identify all outstanding LFOs, variations in reporting methods often proved
challenging. For example, updates to assessments and payments in Pinellas County are
reported in entirely new HTML tables. While the most recent financial summary is visible
on the county website, archived tables are furtively embedded into the HTML; therefore,
particular parsing methods — techniques that convert HTML pages to data amenable to
statistical analysis — potentially pull earlier, no longer relevant financial summaries.174 A
separate but similar issue occurred in Polk County, where financial summaries failed to
174

See Clerk of the Circuit Court and Comptroller Pinellas County, Florida, All Case Records Search at
https://ccmspa.pinellascounty.org/PublicAccess/default.aspx; see also Clerk of Courts & Comptroller Polk
County, Florida, Public Search Options at https://pro.polkcountyclerk.net/PRO/PublicSearch/PublicSearch
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account for payments made. These outdated or inaccurate snapshots consistently overstated
balances owed by those once convicted in Pinellas or Polk counties. Notwithstanding these
limitations, the accurate balance was available elsewhere on the HTML pages in both
jurisdictions.175
Given our nonexistent budget and the impending election, Free Our Vote did not have
the resources to revisit parsing problems that affected a few hundred cases. Since then, we
have implemented methods to systematically address these issues. In the process, we
discovered a number of these individuals owed criminal court debt less than the threshold
determined by our donors’ budgets via our maximal re-enfranchisement strategy. In fact, many
individuals held no criminal debt.
Convenient for purposes of program evaluation, these returning citizens did not receive
a mailer or text to inform them of their eligibility. Given these individuals were excluded from
the information campaign intervention essentially at random, they constitute a plausibly valid
counterfactual group to assess the campaign’s effect on voter participation.
2. Sample Selection. — Our population of interest is composed of those returning
citizens who are already registered to vote, and owed no criminal court debt as of October
2020, with prior felony conviction(s) in only one county. Limitations in Florida Department
of Corrections data restrict us only to those convicted after 1997.176
We further restrict our sample to those otherwise eligible to vote under Amendment
4, thereby excluding anyone convicted of murder or sexual offenses. Restitution, which must
be paid-in-full to meet Amendment 4 criteria, also influences our sample pool. As noted,
restitution balances are difficult to capture. Generally, county clerks do not systematically
record these obligations. Therefore, if a returning citizen ever appeared to owe restitution
they are excluded from our analyses.177 Finally, we omit anyone whose civil rights (including
voting privileges) were already restored via the Florida Clemency Board.178
Table 1 breaks down the total number of observed individuals who filter through these
restrictions. As shown, our control group primarily consists of individuals from Pinellas, Polk,
and Volusia counties, where data complexities were most prevalent.

175

See Clerk of the Circuit Court and Comptroller Pinellas County, Florida, All Case Records Search at
https://ccmspa.pinellascounty.org/PublicAccess/default.aspx; see also Clerk of Courts & Comptroller Polk
County, Florida, Public Search Options at https://pro.polkcountyclerk.net/PRO/PublicSearch/PublicSearch.
176 See Fla. Stat. § XLVII.921 (providing new sentencing guidelines instituted by Florida in 1998; felony court
data prior to the adoption of this framework are generally unavailable).
177 We conservatively exclude anyone with a docket that bears the word “restitution.”
178 See Fla. Stat. § XLVII.940.
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Table 1: Sample Pool for Information Campaign

Table 1 illustrates the construction of the sample of interest for the information campaign executed by Free Our
Vote. Column 1 lists the total number of individuals convicted of a felony offense who did not owe any criminal
court debt as of October 2020. Column 2 removes those who owe restitution from the numbers in Column 1.
Columns 3 and 4 further restrict to those not convicted of murder or a sexual offense, and those whose rights
were not restored via the Florida Clemency Board, respectively. Columns 5 and 6 respectively breakdown the
filtered sample into treatment and control groups.

3. Causal Estimates. — We begin with summary statistics that reinforce the credibility
of our design. Recall that our counterfactual group comprises members of the electorate who
qualify through Amendment 4, but who were not contacted by Free Our Vote due to quasirandom quirks in clerk of courts’ data. If this group is a good counterfactual, it will ideally
mirror the treatment group when we compare measurable attributes of both groups.
Comparing two groups in this manner is done by something known as an orthogonality
t-test, or “balance test.” Table 2 presents the results of that test, which show the recipient
and control groups to be quite similar.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Quasi-Random Information Treatment

Table 2 contains summary statistics of the information campaign recipients in the first column. The second
column lists features for the individuals who were eligible to vote under Amendment 4 criteria but were not
contacted by Free Our Vote. The p-value associated with the orthogonality t-test is listed in the third column.
** and * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.

But for two features — the shares of our treatment and control groups affiliated with
the Republican Party and those who have previously voted — virtually every observable
variable is statistically indistinguishable between the two groups. And there is no good reason
to believe the HTML framework or clerks’ capacity to flawlessly update their websites is
related to the characteristics in Table 2, or to any unobserved characteristics. At any rate, our
empirical specifications control for these characteristics to account for this heterogeneity.
We now present our principal regression analysis for the information campaign. Table
3 below measures the causal impact of being notified that one does not appear to owe LFOs
and is eligible to vote.
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Table 3: Quasi-Random Information Treatment Results

Table 3 shows causal treatment estimates of the information treatment. Contacted beneficiary is a binary variable
that indicates if a returning citizen received any contact regarding eligibility through our information program.
Column 1 comes from a regression with no controls; in Column 2, we account for a variety of factors including
race, age, party affiliation, county of conviction, voting history, and median household income in returning
citizens’ zip codes. The second regression includes fewer observations as estimated household income data are
not available for a few individuals. Standard errors clustered by county of conviction are in parentheses. ** and *
indicate significance at the 1%, and 5% levels, respectively.

The first column of Table 3 presents the most parsimonious regression specification
in this setting. Our outcome variable is a binary variable that captures whether an individual
participated in the 2020 general election – i.e., it is “1” if the person voted, and “0” otherwise.
Our treatment variable is “Contacted,” another binary variable that takes a value of “1” if Free
Our Vote contacted the individual to inform them of their eligibility, and a “0” otherwise.
The second regression adds a host of individual-level and geographic controls; these
are controls for age, race, party affiliation, county of conviction, prior voter participation,
registration date, and zip-code-level median income.179
The coefficients on “Contacted” are interpreted as the percentage point increases in
turnout for those who Free Our Vote contacted. Given that turnout in the counterfactual
group was approximately 52.4%, and contacted people were 8.6 percentage points more likely
to vote (see Table 4, col. 2), the turnout rate for contacted people was 61.0% (= 52.4% + 8.6%).
This means our information campaign increased the likelihood that contacted individuals
would vote by 16% (0.16 ≈ 8.6/52.4).
Our specification of choice yields an estimate (16%) similar in magnitude to other
empirical work on mailers,180 lending credence to our study design. The results suggest that
reducing uncertainty about eligibility improves electoral participation among an ostracized
segment of the population.

179 All measures but income data come from the 2020 Department of Elections statewide voter file; we pulled
2020 zip code level income data from the Internal Revenue Service Statistics of Income data file. We cluster
standard errors at the county-level, a way to control for variation that is correlated with the county of conviction.
See Alberto Abadie, Susan Athey, Guido W. Imbens, and Jeffrey Wooldridge, When Should You Adjust Standard
Errors for Clustering?, NBER Working Paper (2017).
180 See supra notes __ and accompanying text.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4090995

32

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:

D. Measuring the Tax Effect
We showed that in a jurisdiction that practices FFD, informing otherwise eligible returning
citizens that they do not owe any criminal assessments boosts their electoral participation by
about 16%. In this section, we go further and measure whether paying off someone’s debt and
notifying them of this intervention has a similar or even greater effect. No prior research has
measured this sort of intervention.
Free Our Vote’s debt relief program, described in this section, facilitated an additional
natural experiment that permits us to address this gap. Specifically, we gauge the extent to
which criminal debt forgiveness increases voter participation among returning citizens.
1. Debt Relief Program. — Free Our Vote employs data-driven tools to eliminate
criminal court debt. This model serves donors who seek a swift, accurate intervention. Every
dollar received benefits recipients. For example, in one wave of our interventions in Pinellas
County we intended to offset 575 returning citizens’ balances, which we estimated at
$32,258.07; our estimate overstated the true amount owed by about $500 (under 2%).181
Free Our Vote’s applies its data-driven ability to re-enfranchise the largest number of
people for a given budget. This maximization strategy works as follows.
Suppose three people owe $10 each in criminal assessments; three people owe $20; and
one person owes $50. To maximize the number of individuals whose debt can be paid off, one
would sequentially eliminate the smallest debts until the budget is exhausted. Here, $100
could satisfy court debt for the six people who owe either $10 or $20 (3 x $10 + 3 x $20 = $90).
Alternatively, one might clear the debts of the person who owes $50, but doing so would
reduce impact to at most five people ($100 = 1 x $50 + 3 x $10 + 1 x $20). Free Our Vote follows
the former, rather than the latter, strategy.
To execute this procedure at scale, Free Our Vote first reviewed case data across
counties to identify registered voters who would be eligible to vote but for outstanding
criminal court debt. In practice, we excluded any returning citizen who was convicted of
murder or a sexual offense, was under supervised release, or who appeared to ever owe
restitution. We then determined amounts owed per case attributable to convictions; hence,
we did not include, whenever identifiable, amounts such as interest and other post sentence
fees. Subsequently, we aggregated case-level amounts to the individual-level via name, date of
birth and other identifying features.
Next, we presented the clerk in the county with a check that covers criminal
assessments for the maximum number of potential beneficiaries.182 Working with the clerk
helps both sides verify that our calculations are correct and allows us to obtain assurances that
our beneficiaries are, in fact, clear of all LFO obligations in that county.

181

The model adopted by Free Our Vote differs from that of FRRC in myriad ways. We view our organizations
as complementary. Free Our Vote conducts no in-person outreach, is politically inactive, and does not connect
returning citizens with legal aid. Unlike FRRC, which employs a labor-intensive client-based approach, our
model potentially overlooks worthy would-be recipients and does not address these individuals’ long-term legal
needs. See DESMOND MEADE, LET MY PEOPLE VOTE: MY BATTLE TO RESTORE THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF
RETURNING CITIZENS (2020).
182 Free Our Vote’s focus at the county-level arose from our collaboration with FRRC as well as efficiency
purposes. As noted earlier in this article, LFOs older than five years are rarely paid off. County clerks are
amenable to waiving certain fees or discounting balances altogether in exchange for a portion of revenue they
never expect to receive. By focusing on individual counties, Free Our Vote can pay much more debt than the
face value of the checks submitted.
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Upon receipt of satisfaction of judgment from the clerks’ offices, Free Our Vote
coordinated with the CLC to inform beneficiaries of their voter eligibility.183 To execute this
informational outreach, the CLC hired a third-party commercial data vendor that specializes
in matching names and demographic features to its proprietary address and cell phone number
database. Free Our Vote shared its data with the vendor, who then supplemented those
records with addresses.
Finally, staff at the CLC conducted outreach via text messages and mailers. Figure 2
shows examples of the mailer sent to beneficiaries of Free Our Vote’s debt relief program.184
Figure 3: Mailers Sent to Debt Relief Beneficiaries

Figure 3 shows two sides of a mailer sent to beneficiaries of Free Our Vote’s debt relief intervention.

2. Summary Statistics and Sample Selection. — Table 4 below provides details and
summary statistics for our debt relief program. In Alachua County, for example, Free Our
Vote paid the balances of all such individuals it identified whose total amount owed was less
than or equal to $148.38.
Table 4: Summary Statistics for Debt Relief Program

Table 1 shows summary statistics for Free Our Vote’s debt relief program. Column 1 displays the maximum
amount paid per beneficiary in each county. Column 2 lists the number of individuals financially assisted by Free
Our Vote, with the total sum of debts paid listed in Column 3. Note: Duval recipients are not included in the
analyses in Section IV as Free Our Vote partnered with FRRC to intervene at these individuals’ behest, which
used a different payment mechanism. Column 4 lists the mean balance per beneficiary. Columns 5 and 6 capture
183

In a separate arm of Free Our Vote’s advocacy efforts, CLC sent similar notifications to registered voters
who no longer appeared to owe any criminal fees, fines, or court costs and otherwise appeared eligible to vote.
For more details, see Section IV-B.
184 For the people whose fines/fees that Free Our Vote paid off, the mailer indicates that “We believe Free Our
Vote has paid off your court costs, fines, and fees.” Otherwise, the mailer is substantially similar to the one sent
to the individuals who owed no fines and fees.
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how many beneficiaries were notified of settled balances via a mailer or text message, respectively. Column 7
shows the total number of individuals who received some communication.

Among returning citizens whose total balances fell at or below our dollar threshold,185
our population of interest consists of those who would be eligible to vote under Amendment
4 but for outstanding criminal court debt.186 As with our previous analysis, we exclude those
convicted of murder or a sexual offense, as well as those who appear to owe restitution and
did not receive clemency.187 Table 5 captures the number of observed individuals who meet
these criteria.
Table 5: Sample Pool for Debt Relief Program

Table 5 captures the sample of interest for the natural experiments facilitated by Free Our Vote. In Column 1,
the total number of individuals convicted of a felony offense are listed per county. Column 2 adjusts the numbers
in Column 1 for those who potentially owe restitution. In Column 3, the sample is further restricted to those not
convicted of prohibited offenses. The final sample per jurisdiction (in Column 4) eliminates individuals who
received clemency from the figures in Column 3. Columns 5 and 6 decompose the analysis sample into treatment
and control groups, respectively. Note: many of Free Our Vote’s beneficiaries were eligible under Amendment 4
criteria, namely they received clemency or only had withheld adjudications; however, these data were not readily
available until 2021. This is why the beneficiary column in Table 4 differs from the recipient column in Table 5.

Among the population of interest, the mean debtor carried approximately $3,156 in debt.
However, a few large debtors skew this statistic upward; the median returning citizen in this
sample held nearly $980 in court debt.188 Figure 4 depicts the distribution of outstanding
criminal court debt.
185 As before, we focus on individuals with one or more felony convictions, after 1997, in a single county. See
supra note __ and accompanying text.
186
See Clemency Information Sheet, Office of Executive Clemency (March 10, 2021).
https://www.fcor.state.fl.us/docs/clemency/Clemency%20Information%20Sheet.pdf (“If adjudication was
Withheld in your case(s), you did not lose your civil rights, which includes the right to vote, serve on a jury and
hold public office.” Likewise, if the state prosecutor drops the charges or a jury finds the defendant not guilty,
then any court debt has no bearing on voting privileges.).
187 As with our analysis in the previous section, we exclude everyone with a docket that includes the word
“restitution.”
188 Michael Morse found a median amount of $815 in fines and fees assessed and $667 remaining across a sample
of 400,000 Florida felony cases. See Morse, supra note __, at 1184. See also Alexes Harris, Heather Evans &
Katherine Beckett, Drawing Blood from Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in the Contemporary United States, 115
AM. J. SOC. & SOCIO. 1753, 1774 tbl.5 (2010) (finding median LFO amount of $1,347 across 3,366 felony cases in
Washington state); see also Claire Greenberg, Marc Meredith & Michael Morse, The Growing and Broad Nature
of Legal Financial Obligations: Evidence from Alabama Court Records, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1079, 1104 fig.4a.1, 1105
fig.4a.2 (2016) (median balance of $2,000 for sample of felonies in Alabama in 2005).
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Figure 4: Distribution of LFOs

Figure 4 shows the distribution of criminal court debt held by individuals convicted in one county but who
otherwise are eligible to vote under Amendment 4 criteria. The distribution, with bins incremented by $50, has
been truncated above $5,400, which essentially constitutes the 95th percentile. The vertical line at $150
approximates the thresholds at which Free Our Vote intervened.

3. Descriptive Evidence. — Table 6 below shows descriptive evidence from the dataset
of all LFO holders that strongly suggests Free Our Vote’s debt relief interventions bolstered
voter turnout among the returning citizen population.
Table 6: Descriptive Results from 2020 General Election
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Table 6 shows regression coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from regressions of a binary variable
that equals “1” if a returning citizen voted in the 2020 general election on our intervention variables. Beneficiary
is a binary variable that indicates if Free Our Vote paid off an individuals’ LFOs. Contacted, similarly, takes a
value of “1” if Free Our Vote sent a mailer or text message to beneficiaries. We control for a host of factors
including total criminal court debt due, race, age, party affiliation, county of conviction, voting history, and
median household income in returning citizens’ zip codes. All estimates are clustered at the county-level. The
two regressions with all controls rely on fewer data points as reliable zip code median household income data are
not available for nine individuals in the sample. The results suggest Free Our Vote’s intervention meaningfully
increased voter turnout. That said, these results should be interpreted carefully as they do not represent
treatment effects. Standard errors clustered by individual are in parentheses. ** and * indicate significance at the
1% and 5% levels, respectively.

In each specification in Table 6, the outcome is an indicator variable for a ballot cast
in the 2020 general election. Therefore, each explanatory variable can be described in terms
of probabilities. The variable of interest — beneficiary — receives a value of one if the debt
holder benefited from our relief program; otherwise, it is zero. The first three models differ in
their coverage of controls. The first lacks any additional independent variables; the second
includes a singular control for total LFO balance; and the third incorporates a host of controls.
The fourth specification adapts the third via the inclusion of a linear term that indicates if
Free Our Vote contacted the beneficiary via a mailer or text message, with the same covariates
as in Section IV-B.
Regardless of included controls, the collective evidence implies elimination of felony
financial obligations is associated with a statistically significant increase in voter turnout. This
effect appears to be concentrated among those who received notification of their eligibility,
as per column 4. In terms of magnitude, the descriptive findings suggest debt relief correlates
with approximately 15-44% higher voter turnout relative to the baseline (44%) in this
population. For comparison, nearly 77% of registered voters in Florida participated in the 2020
general election.189
Note that these estimates are purely suggestive and not causal. The analyses associated
with Table 6 include debtors who owe sizably more than our county-specific thresholds.
Debtors with larger balances likely differ from our beneficiary pool across multiple
characteristics. For example, criminal debt correlates with the severity of the crime tied to the
conviction. People who engage in more serious illegal activities generally do not closely
resemble those convicted of lesser felonies. Likewise, those on the right-hand side of the
thresholds are much more predisposed to be habitual offenders. These observable
dissimilarities hint at potential unobservable heterogeneities as well. In concert, these
variations may drive the calculations.
4. Causal Estimates. — As noted in Section IV-C, a series of data irregularities led Free
Our Vote to consistently overestimate LFOs. Upon amelioration of these issues, we
discovered a tranche of returning citizens who owed criminal court debt less than the
thresholds imposed by our donors’ financial limits. Because these individuals owed
comparable amounts to our beneficiaries, we can use the fact Free Our Vote did not intervene
on their behalf to measure the impact of our debt elimination program. In effect, this adds
an incremental restriction to our sample associated with the descriptive evidence. In other

189

See Voter Turnout, Florida Division of Elections, https://www.dos.myflorida.com/elections/data-statistics/
elections-data/voter-turnout/.
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words, our analysis now homes in on those with a balance less than or equal to our maximal
re-enfranchisement strategy thresholds.
The validity of this framework relies upon the quasi-randomness that prompted
individuals’ exclusion from treatment. As with the analysis in Section IV-C, there is no reason
to believe idiosyncrasies in clerk of courts’ websites explain their omission from our
beneficiary pool. Empirical evidence in favor of this assumption can be found in Table 7.
Table 7: Summary Statistics for Quasi-Random Debt Relief Treatment

Table 7 contains summary statistics of the beneficiaries in column 1. The next column lists those same features
for the individuals who owed less than the threshold per county but did not receive treatment due to technical
challenges. The p-value associated with the orthogonality t-test is listed in the final column. ** and * indicate
significance at the .1%, and 5% levels, respectively.

Like Table 2, Table 7 presents an orthogonality t-test for our beneficiary and control
groups. None of the observable variables in Table 7 exhibits a statistically significant
difference, as indicated by the p-values in column (3). This result reinforces the validity of our
estimates. Regardless, our preferred specifications control for these features.
We turn to our primary results associated with this natural experiment, which are
presented in Table 8 below.
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Table 8: Quasi-Random Debt Relief Treatment Results

Table 8 shows regression coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) associated with the quasi-random
treatment. The outcome variable in each is an indicator variable that identifies if an individual voted in the 2020
general election. Our first variable of interest, beneficiary, takes the value of one if Free Our Vote paid the
remaining LFO balance for an individual; contacted is similarly defined but limits the beneficiary pool to those
who received notification of the zero balance. The control variables include total criminal court debt due prior
to the intervention, demographic features, electoral data such as party affiliation and voter history, county of
conviction, and estimated median household income in returning citizens’ communities. We cluster estimates at
the county-level. Household income data are unavailable for three individuals, which explains the change in
sample size. Given average voter turnout of 42% in the control, our preferred estimates suggest abatement of
criminal court debt increased voter turnout by approximately 26% in this group. Standard errors clustered by
individual are in parentheses. ** and * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.

The composition of Table 8 mirrors those of Tables 4 and 6. The key distinction
between Tables 6 and 8 lies in the construction of the counterfactual group. Recall, the
control group in Table 8 consists of individuals with LFO balances less than the county
threshold but who did not benefit from Free Our Vote’s debt relief program. The effects are
robust across specification; the evidence documents statistically significant increases in voter
turnout among our beneficiary population. Once again, we observe the effects exclusively in
the group who received the mailer or text messages. The results in column 4, therefore,
capture our preferred point estimates.
The precise coefficient implies — relative to the mean voter turnout in the
counterfactual — LFO abatement prompted a 26% increase in voter participation. Under the
assumption of independence, which appears to hold given the quasi-random assignment
mechanism and the evidence in Table 7, this effect represents the average treatment effect of
felony debt relief on voter participation.190
Our results lend support to the narrative that indigency restricts participation among
returning citizens. This flies in the face of accusations that this group of individuals is simply
190

See Scott Cunningham, CAUSAL INFERENCE: THE MIXTAPE (Yale Univ. Press 2020); see also Donald B.
Rubin, Estimating Causal Effects of Treatments in Randomized and Nonrandomized Studies, 66 J. ED. PSY. 688 (1974).
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disinterested in the political process. Moreover, we note that our debt treatment program
appears to have induced larger effects than the information campaign. This seems to suggest
there is additional benefit to debt elimination. Perhaps, the symmetric argument — S.B.7066
restrictions chilled individuals with criminal court debt more than returning citizens with no
LFO balances — holds.191
5. Data Limitations. — As the above analysis implies, mean voter participation was not
zero in the group of people who apparently owed LFOs but did not receive debt relief from
Free Our Vote. However, this does not establish evidence of improper voting. Rather, an
abundance of factors explains this pattern. The thought experiment behind our intervention
poses the question of what turnout would look like in the absence of Free Our Vote settling
LFO balances. That framework inherently accepts the premise that returning citizens may
clear their accounts on their own or through other channels, such as FRRC. Indeed, several
returning citizens in our sample did exactly that after we intervened.
Additionally, resource constrained clerks may not have the means to update records;
while we scraped data in October 2020, felony financial obligations may not have reflected
actual balances. Therefore, our sample may falsely attribute criminal court debt to individuals
who remedied their accounts. In either case, if an individual appeared to carry any debt as of
our interventions, they are included in our sample as non-beneficiaries.
Additional factors explain the level of participation in the population of felony financial
debt holders. Of the individuals for whom we have LFO data, approximately 13.3% previously
received clemency. As noted above, the vast majority benefited from reforms under Governor
Charlie Crist, between 2007 and 2011.
Our dataset potentially understates the number of clemency recipients. The state’s
publicly accessible database is not easily searchable. It requires exact matches of individuals’
first and last names as well as either their date of birth or corrections ID number.192 Variations
in naming conventions, including maiden names, aliases, matronymic, or patronymic surname
combinations, reduce our confidence that our final sample contains no additional clemency
recipients. Moreover, the oscillating clemency process potentially obscures returning citizens
whose civil rights were officially restored in other unobserved ways. For example, it is unclear
if the state database spans all recipients; the Office of Executive Clemency did not respond to
a data request we submitted to explore this issue.
Outside these timing and data limitations, abatement of criminal court debt may be
missing for other reasons. For instance, many jurisdictions permit returning citizens to engage
in charitable work rather than directly settle LFOs.193 Court records do not systematically
191 We caveat this statement with two facts. One, in an unreported difference-in-differences framework, we fail
to statistically distinguish the treatment effects associated with the notification and debt relief programs; small
sample size and power issues might be hindering us. Separately, the effects of eliminating LFOs might not be
symmetric to imposing S.B.7066 requirements.
In addition, we are pursuing ongoing research using a regression discontinuity framework that focuses on
differences in voter participation above and below the threshold monetary cutoffs used by Free Our Vote to
determine beneficiary status. Here, we observe much larger treatment effects concentrated among the postAmendment 4 registrants. However, these local average treatment effects are brittle, as they are estimated from
a specification with very few observations. We plan to supplement these results with additional data in a future
project.
192 See Restoration of Civil Rights Search, Office of Executive Clemency Florida Commission on Offender Review
https://fpcweb.fcor.state.fl.us.
193 See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 938.30(2). See also, Florida Court Clerks & Comptrollers, 2021 Assessments and Collections
Report, https://www.flclerks.com/page/AssessmentsCollections (community service represents a negligible share
of payments.). See also, Rebekah Diller, Brennan Center for Justice, The Hidden Costs of Florida’s Criminal Justice
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include this information. In at least one case, the Florida Department of Corrections failed to
notify the relevant clerk of court that an individual performed community service that cleared
their account.
Finally, the confusion surrounding Amendment 4 and S.B.7066 influenced both
returning citizens and bureaucrats tasked with monitoring elections. Some individuals believed
if they satisfied court order payment plans, they were eligible to vote.194 Others, unaware of
outstanding debts, registered with the approval of their county board of elections; the Division
of Elections failed to properly flag these registrants.
Jointly, these phenomena explain the seemingly high turnout among non-beneficiaries
in our population of interest. None of these factors, however, should affect the validity of our
results so long as they apply uniformly to individuals in our sample. There is no a priori reason
to believe they disconcertingly affect sub-samples; in fact, given the rigor with which we vetted
beneficiaries, unobserved factors that account for voters in our control population likely
attenuate our results. That said, no observable data discounts our methodologies.

E. Placebo Test
One could possibly argue that our findings are driven by heightened salience and not
by the mechanisms we propose. That is, our notifications boosted voter turnout simply by
making recipients more aware of the upcoming election rather than by easing their concerns
about their LFO status (information channel) or reducing their price to vote (tax channel).
To test this alternate hypothesis, we now consider a falsification exercise. This
incidental experimental framework uses mailers or text messages inadvertently sent to
individuals who received clemency and owe no criminal court debt.
This cohort — irrespective of Amendment 4 — met voter eligibility requirements;
moreover, their privileges were officially restored and recognized by the Florida executive
branch, an experience few likely forget. Because of the assurances they received, they were
less likely to be affected by notifications reminding them of their eligibility.
We impose the same restrictions as before on the treatment and control groups,
except now we limit our sample only to those individuals for whom civil rights were previously
restored. Therefore, the two groups should now be alike but for the fact that those in the
treatment arm happened to receive a mailer or text message notifying them that they appear
to be eligible to vote.
Our final sample consists of 1,050 returning citizens; of this group, we contacted 785.
Once again, our sample appears to be fairly well-balanced when conducting an orthogonality
t-test, as shown in Table 9.

Fees
(2010),
at
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_The%20HiddenCosts-Florida%27s-Criminal-Justice-Fees.pdf. (“...it appears that in practice, courts seldom use it [conversion
to community service]. In a [2007] report from court clerks, only 16 of 67 counties reported converting any
mandatory LFOs imposed in felony cases to community service.”).
194 See John Pacenti, Felon Voting: Forcing Fees to be Paid Not an Issue for Some Wealthy Felons, The Palm Beach Post,
https://www.palmbeachpost.com/story/news/2020/09/29/felon-voting-paying-fees-not-issue-somewealthy-felons/3560154001/.
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Table 9: Summary Statistics for Placebo Test

Table 9 contains summary statistics of the recipients in column 1. The next column lists those same features for
the individuals who owed no criminal debt but did not receive a mailer due to data anomalies. The balance test
p-value is listed in the final column. The p-value associated with the orthogonality t-test is listed in the final
column. ** and * indicate significance at the .1%, and 5% levels, respectively.

As with our previous analyses, most of the observable characteristics are balanced but
for three. Among these variables that differ at conventional levels of significance, none failed
the orthogonality tests in the previous two sections. Hence, there is no observable systematic
pattern in the construction of our control and treatment groups. Furthermore, the coefficient
associated with “Days Registered Before Election” is economically insignificant (0.0000008).
Moreover, the variables that fail this orthogonality test are not the same as the two that failed
in the information campaign (whether the individual was a Republican or a prior voter). That
lends further credibility to the claim that there are no systematic baseline differences between
treatment and control groups in our specifications.195 Regardless, there should be no
correlation between these features and the data issues that prompted the construction of the
control and treatment groups.
We now present the results of the falsification test in Table 10.
195

In sum, only 4 of 40 variables in our orthogonality tests fail balance tests. This implies nearly 90% of the
variables are balanced, which suggests counterfactual groups are well chosen.
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Table 10: Placebo Test Results

Table 10 contains results associated with the placebo test. The dependent variable identifies if an individual
participated in the 2020 general election. The variable of interest, contacted, is coded to equal one if Free Our
Vote’s agency partners notified an individual they were eligible to vote. Again, the control variables include
demographic features, electoral data such as party affiliation and voter history, county of conviction, and
estimated median household income in returning citizens’ communities. Estimates are clustered at the countylevel. Household income data are unavailable for five individuals, which accounts for the change in sample size.
The results are not statistically significant at any conventional degree of confidence.

The results in Table 10, like those throughout the paper, consist of two specifications.
The first lacks any control variables, whereas the second includes the explanatory variables
we have consistently employed. Both specifications result in similar estimates that are not
statistically different from zero.
This evidence is reassuring. It further suggests that Free Our Vote encouraged
participation only among those re-enfranchised through Amendment 4. In other words, the
mechanism that drives our results does not appear to be related to increased salience about
the election among those with felony convictions.

V. ASSESSING THE ASSESSMENTS
Our empirical analyses above demonstrate that FFD forestalls otherwise qualified returning
citizens from casting a ballot,196 either by creating uncertainty surrounding eligibility or by
pricing individuals out of the ballot box. As we show below, such phenomena generate sizable
social costs. The bulwark of extant evidence indicates ostracizing this marginalized
population from the electoral process exacerbates their alienation.197 Such restrictions,
therefore, undermine the democratic fiber of the nation and erode faith in already decaying
institutions.198
Some policymakers contend this lens distorts the discussion; they espouse the belief
that FFD, regardless of its social cost, is fundamentally moral.199 According to this
perspective, full reconciliation with the community cannot be realized until returning citizens
196

See supra notes __ and accompanying text.
See infra notes __ and accompanying text.
198 See supra notes __ and accompanying text.
199 See, e.g., Clegg, Conway, & Lee, supra note __.
197
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remedy their LFOs. Beyond this ethical supposition, many others adopt the consequentialist
view that FFD marginally incentivizes former defendants to monetarily support criminal legal
systems; in other words, exclusion from the electorate galvanizes collection of “user” fees that
finance clerks’ offices and court systems.200
Here, we challenge both claims. Outstanding LFOs hardly evince immorality among
returning citizens. For one, it is virtually impossible, technological solutions like Free Our
Vote aside, for these individuals to know the remaining criminal debt they owe. Indigency,
prevalent among those with felony backgrounds, further hampers these individuals’ capacity
to resolve their financial disrepair.201 Therefore, logistical and socioeconomic realities subvert
much of the rationale that underlies the putative ethics of FFD.
With respect to claims that FFD incentivizes fee payment, its proponents ignore the
empirical realities of fee collection. These regressive assessments, levied against an
economically anemic subset of the population, typically remain uncollected.202 And while
FFD might not help generate revenue, it likely creates enduring harms of social alienation
and an increased risk of recidivism, which likely disparately impact poor and Black
defendants.

A. “Sometimes Easy, Sometimes Hard, Sometimes Impossible”
To determine if one currently owes any criminal LFOs, an individual must exhibit a fluency
in both the law and the decentralized patchwork of criminal data systems. Expert witnesses
with doctorates in political science and a team of Ph.D. candidates could not perfectly
ascertain balances in Florida.203 As Judge Hinkle aptly noted in the Amendment 4 litigation,
calculating applicable LFOs for a returning citizen is “sometimes easy, sometimes hard,
sometimes impossible.”204 We highlight some of these difficulties below.
1. Identifying Relevant LFOs. — To begin, case information prior to the advent of
digitalized recordkeeping may be altogether inaccessible. In Florida, readily available criminal
financial data did not exist until 1998. County clerks may not even possess paper copies of
criminal court records. Judge Hinkle noted exactly that; clerks instructed one individual —
convicted of felonies between 1975 and 1988 — that they could not locate her files.205
Therefore, returning citizens, and the state, may simply lack the proper documentation to
track LFO balances.
The absence of relevant data does not stem purely from records retention issues. Only
certain LFOs or components fall under the criteria of Amendment 4. Disqualifying court
costs in Florida must be imposed with the sentence; assessments levied afterward fall outside
of Amendment 4.206 Post-sentence costs are common. For example, failure to make court
200 Ann Cammett, Shadow Citizen: Felony Disenfranchisement and the Criminalization of Debt, 117 Pa. St. L. Rev 349,
353 (2012).
201 See Fla. Ct. Clerks & Comptrollers, 2018 Annual Assessments and Collections Report 18 (2018),
https://flccoc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/2018-Annual-Assessments-and-Collections-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F5DX-L4JK]. (Clerks of Court estimated that approximately 23% of debt assessed in 2018 will
not be collected due to indigency).
202 See infra notes __ and accompanying text.
203 Jones v. DeSantis, 420 F. Supp, 3d 1196, 1220 (N.D. Fla. 2020).
204 Id. at__.
205 Jones v. DeSantis, 420 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1209 (N.D. Fla. 2020).
206 See also Fla. Stat. § 98.0751(2)(a)(6).
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stipulated payments on-time prompts a litany of fees as well as a potential driver’s license
suspension.207 For financially constrained individuals dependent on vehicles, this could result
in a “cycle” of fees as Clerk Pam Childers of Escambia County put it.
The defendant needs to drive but either cannot afford to pay or chooses not to
pay [their] court costs and fines. The defendant then gets pulled over and ends
up with a charge for driving with a suspended license, which likely ends with
additional court costs.208
Likewise, parole or probation violations result in other post-sentence fees. Despite
their frequency, few jurisdictions distinguish sentencing costs from those raised later; for
older cases, this issue is substantially more pronounced. A characteristic example is in Table
6, which is pulled directly from a case in Brevard County.
Table 11: Assessment Example from Brevard County

Table 11: “Receivable” lists the state trust that obtains collections per the “Amount Assessed” column. The third
and fourth columns detail any amounts waived or paid, respectively. The penultimate column captures an
expected payment date. The last column indicates the remaining balance per line item.

Table 11 contains the financial summary for a case involving a twenty-nine-year-old
defendant who pled guilty to battery in 2019. This person eventually violated the terms of
their probation agreement. Under the current interpretation of Amendment 4, the costs
associated with the original sentence must be paid for the defendant to vote. The assessments
that arose from the violation of probation, however, do not inhibit this individual’s eligibility.
207

Fla. Stat. Title XXIII. Motor Vehicles § 322.245., Fla. Stat. Title XXIII. Motor Vehicles § 318.15.
Free Our Vote and the Fines and Fees Justice Center (FFJC) conducted a joint survey of financing issues
facing clerks of court. Clerk Pam Childers detailed this issue in response to the question, “In your opinion, what
are the downfalls of suspending a person's driver's license for unpaid fines or fees?” Florida Clerk of Courts
Survey (2021), results on file with authors.
208
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As Table 11 demonstrates, there is no clear way to distinguish which assessments are linked
with the original sentence.209 Hence, there is no way from this record to precisely determine
the minimal amount the individual must pay to regain voting privileges.
2. Accounting and data complexities. — This opacity is amplified by complexities and
confusion related to accounting methods that Florida adopted to calculate remaining LFO
balances. Initially, the state accepted the “actual-balance” method to track payments. Under
this approach, a clerk simply subtracts the amount paid from the total amount owed to
calculate the remaining LFO balance.
Under this approach, returning citizen eligibility hinges upon the discretion of the
clerk of court. Consider a hypothetical example. Suppose an individual owed $150 in LFOs
associated with their felony conviction. After some time, the clerk assessed $80 in collection
fees and $40 in interest. The total balance owed is $150 + $80 + $40 = $270.
Now, suppose the individual pays $200; this could cover the original $150 in LFOs
associated with the felony conviction. Instead, the clerk arbitrarily applies the $200 to cover
the $120 in collection fees and interest. The clerk allocates the remaining $80 (=$200-$120)
to the original $150 owed. That individual would still technically owe $70 (=$150 – $80) on the
original amount.
Though this imagined member of the electorate paid more than the original LFO tied
to their conviction, the state originally argued this person would be ineligible to vote due to
their outstanding balance. In essence, eligibility turns on the inclinations of clerks of court.
In March 2020, just before trial in federal district court, the state suddenly changed
its approach; it adopted an “every-dollar” accounting method for payments. Under this more
flexible methodology, the state recognizes any payment — even those made against postsentence costs — as a credit toward voter eligibility. In the previous example, because the
$200 payment exceeded the $150 in LFOs associated with the felony conviction, the returning
citizen would be eligible to vote.
Yet, problems remained: often, clerks are not aware whether a payment has been
made, or the extent of such payments. Several counties, such as Duval County, permit
collections agencies like Penn Credit Corporation to receive a mutable share of payments
before passing the remainder to county courts.210 If clerks cannot identify these payments,
individuals convicted of felonies decades ago should not be expected to either. Judge Hinkle,
recognizing this nuisance, stated, “the every-dollar method makes the pay-to-vote system’s
constitutional deficiencies worse.”211
The Kafkaesque data situation only deteriorates further into the absurd. Guilty
adjudications on felonies are the only dispositions that factor into financial
disenfranchisement.212 While that condition seems straightforward, the data offer a markedly
different perspective; for example, nearly 7.5% of Pinellas County cases lack a disposition.213

209

The field titled “Due Date” merely indicates when the clerk expected payments.
The FFJC requested collections contracts from all 67 counties. The details of the contract document that
the Duval County clerk determines Penn Credit Corporation’s fees on an ad hoc basis and allows the third-party
entity to collect its revenue first.
211 Jones v. DeSantis, 462 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1226 (N.D. Fla. 2020).
212 By contrast, LFOs associated with cases for which the disposition is “withheld adjudication,” do not count
for voter disenfranchisement purposes. As such, such cases should be excluded from any calculation of relevant
LFOs for a defendant. See supra note __.
213 For purposes of our analyses, we treat defendants in cases without dispositions as guilty.
210
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Likewise, S.B.7066 requires individuals to settle all civil liens — conversions of
criminal obligations individuals cannot afford to pay into civil court matters — to vote.214
While the questionable ethics around this provision raise concern, so too do the available
data; in cases with a conversion, the criminal balance is reduced to zero, which conceals the
true amount due.
These limitations — as well as those raised in Section IV above — do not exhaust the
considerations one needs to make to determine their eligibility. If trained legal and empirical
scholars well-versed in Florida criminal court data cannot perfectly calculate the amount an
individual must pay to become re-enfranchised, it is more than unreasonable to expect
returning citizens to do so. Assuredly, many well-intentioned individuals will find the time
commitment too costly to even determine if they are able to settle their debts. Others, who
possess the means to eliminate their LFOs, may be frightened by the risk of prosecution; the
uncertainty about hidden costs only heightens such anxieties. Our empirical findings align
with these narratives.
To be sure, Florida represents a particularly difficult case for determining LFO
violations. Unlike other states, the presence of any outstanding LFO tied to a felony
conviction — whether a fine, fee or restitution — blocks an individual from the ballot box.
Data issues are especially perverse in Florida as well; other states with an integrated data
system across its jurisdictions may avoid some of these issues.
Nonetheless, it is unlikely that centralized data represent a panacea. The transfer of
balances to collections agencies, conversion to liens, fungibility of payments, identification of
community service, and missing data points would continue to plague calculation efforts.
Moreover, restitution payments — which are typically made directly to the victim — would
likely still be unobserved and untraceable.215 More generally, critics have long bemoaned the
“stunning lack of information and transparency surrounding felon disenfranchisement around
the country.”216 In 1996, the Department of Justice noted the wide variation of
disenfranchisement laws across the country was “something of a national crazy-quilt of
disqualifications and restoration procedures.”217
Such data problems emphasize that returning citizens’ failure to satisfy LFO
requirements implies little in terms of ethics. Likewise, these problems hint at much larger
costs that would be needed to make the system even remotely functional.

B. LFOs and Revenue Generation
As discussed in Section II-C, courts across the country have greatly expanded the use of
criminal assessments, particularly user fees, over the past fifty years. Despite ever-expanding
fee categories, most assessments remain uncollected.
For example, Iowa judges ordered $159 million in restitution between 2007 and 2012;
however, less than 12% ($19 million) was paid during that time. A study found that more than
90% of all parolees discharged between 2003 and 2008 in Texas still owed restitution as of
214

Fla. Stat. § 98.0751(2)(a)5.c.
Jones v. DeSantis, 462 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1224 (N.D. Fla. 2020).
216 Felons and the Right to Vote, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2004).
217 Margaret Colgate Love & Susan M. Kuzma, Civil Disabilities of Convicted Felons: A State-By-State Survey,
Department of Justice (Oct. 1996), at https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/pr/195110.pdf (cited by Alec C. Ewald, A
‘Crazy-Quilt’ of Tiny Pieces: State and Local Administration of American Criminal Disenfranchisement Laws, The
Sentencing Project (Nov. 2005).
215
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2008.218 Another study showed that only 12% of restitution ordered in Maryland in fiscal year
2007 was collected by the end of the following year.219 Despite imposing $7.20 billion in
additional monetary sanctions and accrued interest for criminal cases in 2020, the federal
government received only $1.95 billion in payments in that year.220
Florida fares no better than these other jurisdictions. In Fiscal Year 2017-18, Florida
assessed $235.6 million in fines and fees221 in circuit criminal cases statewide;222 it collected
only 9.31% of these assessments.223 Similarly, the state collected only 11% of $5.1 million dollars
in fees assessed against juveniles in 2009.224
Florida court clerks themselves recognize the inefficiency of this system; they are less
than sanguine as to the prospects of collecting outstanding debts. To illustrate, the Florida
Clerks of Court Operations Corporation (FCCOC) sets performance standards for clerks’
collection of fines and fees.225 The annual collections rate that the FCCOC sets for circuit
criminal cases is just 9%.226 So if clerks collect more than 9% of assessed fines and fees, they
exceed FCCOC expectations.
LFOs not immediately paid are unlikely to ever be collected. Our analysis of
collections data confirms that the vast majority of payments made for fines and fees occur
within the first few years of case resolution.
Consider data from Lee County, a jurisdiction in southwest Florida with
approximately 800,000 residents. Free Our Vote identified 27,189 felony cases with
assessments in Lee County from 2010 or earlier. Ten years later, no payments had yet been
made on 43.4% (11,800) of those cases. Of the remaining 56.6% (15,389) cases in Lee County
with some payment activity, over 90% of inflows came within the first five years after the
first charge. This is evident in Figure 5 below, which shows when payments were made in
these cases relative to the initial charge date.227

218 The National Center for Victims of Crime, Making Restitution Real: Five Case Studies on Improving Restitution
Collection (2011) (citing Chris Vogel, Crime Doesn’t Pay(back): A Houston Press Special Report on Court-Ordered
Restitutions in Texas, Houston Press (Dec. 4, 2008)).
219 The National Center for Victims of Crime, Making Restitution Real: Five Case Studies on Improving Restitution
Collection (2011) (referencing data from the Maryland Division of Parole and Probation). Hundreds of millions,
or even billions, in restitution likely remains unpaid in multiple states. See id. (stating unpaid restitution payments
included $638 million in Pennsylvania, $831 million in Arizona, and $70 million in a single Nevada county).
220 United States Attorneys’ Annual Statistical Report (Fiscal Year 2020), at Table 8A (United States Attorney
Debt Collection for Fiscal Year 2020) 32. Of course, these payments might be for previous fiscal years, but the
rough ratio of payments received to newly imposed debt and interest is roughly stable over the years, suggesting
that simply dividing receipts over payments for a particular fiscal year is sufficient for our rough estimate here
of collection rate.
221 See Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability, Assessment, Collection, and Distribution
of Fines and Fees in Criminal Cases, Report No. 19-14 (Nov. 2019), at https://perma.cc/5YT3-W4C7.
222 In Florida, criminal prosecution of all felonies takes place in circuit criminal courts. See Florida Courts, Trial
Courts — Circuit, at https://www.flcourts.org/Florida-Courts/Trial-Courts-Circuit (last visited Jan. 27, 2022).
The state also has county criminal courts that handle misdemeanors. See Florida Courts, Trial Courts — County,
at https://www.flcourts.org/Florida-Courts/Trial-Courts-County (last visited Jan. 27, 2022).
223 See Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability (OPPAGA), Assessment, Collection, and
Distribution of Fines and Fees in Criminal Cases, Report No. 19-14 (Nov. 2019), at https://perma.cc/5YT3-W4C7.
224 See Fines & Fees Justice Center, Juvenile Fees Are Harming Florida’s Youth, Families, and Future (last visited Jan.
26, 2022), at https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/campaigns/florida-campaign-fines-fees/.
225 See OPPAGA, supra note __.
226 Id.
227 See id, (showing collection rate for 1st and 2nd degree felonies in Florida topping off at around 8% and 14%,
respectively, four years after being assessed, for cases disposition dates during Fiscal Year 2015-16).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4090995

48

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:

Figure 5: Payment Timing for LFOs in Lee County

Figure 5 shows a histogram of payments made on LFOs in Lee County, in years relative to the first charge in the
case. Cases are limited to those charged in 2010 or earlier, on which at least one payment was made.

Lee County is not unusual; we observe similar trends in all jurisdictions. For instance,
more than 80% of assessments remain outstanding after five years in Escambia County.
Low collection rates should not be surprising. One could hardly overlook the fact that
returning citizens tend to lack financial stability. Individuals exposed to the criminal court
system disproportionately come from low-income communities.228 Nearly 40% of Americans
are not financially positioned to bear an unexpected $400 bill; therefore, it seems
exceptionally unlikely those with felony records will ever be able to pay off LFO balances that
typically exceed $400.229 Clerks of courts, aware of this, expect substantial shares of
assessments to remain permanently outstanding due to indigency.230
As these data suggest, the vast majority of LFO debt will remain uncollected.
Returning citizens with sparse financial means will not be incentivized to remedy their
criminal court debt. Hence, one of the primary arguments in favor of FFD fails in practice.
Namely, induced payment on assessments cannot realistically alleviate court financing
issues.231
228

See Jens Ludwig, Greg J. Duncan, and Paul Hirschfield, Urban Poverty and Juvenile Crime: Evidence from a
Randomized Housing-Mobility Experiment as well Julia Haggerty, Patricia H. Guide, Mark Delorey, Ray Rasker,
Long-term effects of income specialization in oil and gas extraction: The U.S. West, 1980–2011.
229 The Board of the Federal Reserve System, Report on the Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2017.
230 See Fla. Ct. Clerks & Comptrollers, 2018 Annual Assessments and Collections Report 18 (2018),
https://flccoc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/2018-Annual-Assessments-and-Collections-Report.pdf
231 Most individuals who are subject to FFD lose their voting privileges because of fees they owe, as compared
to fines or restitution. To illustrate, consider data from Alachua County, a small county in central Florida that
includes Gainesville (home of the University of Florida). Looking at felonies prosecuted since 1998, Free Our
Vote identified 30,235 cases in which a defendant was financially disenfranchised due to an LFO obligation. In
nearly half of those cases (14,864), the financial disenfranchisement was solely due to fees owed in the case, and
not because of any other LFO obligation. Our results are consistent with prior research in Alabama, where more
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C. Enduring Harms
Existing research suggests voter disenfranchisement — and hence, likely FFD — create
myriad social harms. For one, empirical evidence implies that felony disenfranchisement
might encourage future criminal activity. According to estimates from the Washington
Economics Group, restoration of civil rights, including voting rights, correlates with a 12.8%
decrease in recidivism.232 Moreover, Christopher Uggen and Jeff Manza show that amongst
those who live in states that re-enfranchise, voters are 0.6 times less likely to self-report any
crime relative to non-voters.233
Outside of that evidence, an extensive literature establishes the importance of social
esteem as an extrinsic incentive for pro-social behavior in a variety of contexts.234 Researchers
have demonstrated that similar phenomena exist in the context of voting; people vote because
they want to identify as voters.235 FFD de facto eliminates many returning citizens’
opportunities to vote, and thereby the recognition of their peers as re-integrated stakeholders
in society.
Indeed, research in sociology and psychology suggests the act of political participation
can attenuate psychological distress, especially for those in marginalized communities.236
Using data from Switzerland, Alois Stutzer and Bruno Frey demonstrate the ability to vote
serves an important source of “procedural utility.” It empowers people to feel like they have
a voice in the democratic process independent of electoral outcomes.237 Evidence from
another large-scale randomized-controlled trial shows that voters are more likely to engage in
other prosocial behavior.238 Accordingly, the authors suggest that messages that promote
than half of assessed LFOs stemmed from court fees. Marc Meredith & Michael Morse, Discretionary
Disenfranchisement: The Case of Legal Financial Obligations, 46 J. LEG. STUD. 309 (2017).
232 See Washington Economics Group, Economic Impacts of Restoring the Eligibility to Vote for Floridians with Felony
Convictions as a Result of Passage of Amendment 4, (2018) (arguing that passage of Amendment 4 would benefit
Florida taxpayers by reducing recidivism rates, and hence court and imprisonment costs, and increasing earning
potential for returning citizens); see also Guy Padraic Hamilton-Smith and Matt Vogel, The Violence of
Voicelessness: The Impact of Felony Disenfranchisement on Recidivism, 22 BERKELEY LA RAZA LAW JOURNAL, (2), 427
(2019) (finding that former defendants in states that disenfranchise are about 10% more likely to recidivate than
those in states that franchise after release even after controlling for the individual’s demographic characteristics
and criminal history). Such evidence runs counter to claims by some FFD proponents, that if allowed the right
to vote, people with past felony convictions would help elect legislators who are “soft on crime.”
233 See Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Voting and Subsequent Crime and Arrest: Evidence from a Community Sample,
36 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW, 193-215 (2004); see also Murat C. Mungan, Over-Incarceration and
Disenfranchisement, 172 PUB. CHOICE 377 (2017) (modeling how felon disenfranchisement laws might lead to
longer than optimal sentences for crimes). See Michael Morley, Felon Rights? Don’t Let Lawbreakers Elect Soft-onCrime Lawmakers, ORLANDO SENTINEL, https://www.orlandosentinel.com/opinion/os-ed-no-rights-for-felons
-front-burner-20170613-story.html.
234 See Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Incentives and Prosocial Behavior, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 1652 (2006).
235 See William Harbaugh, If People Vote Because They Like To, Then Why Do So Many of Them Lie?, 89 PUB. CHOICE
63 (1996); see also, S. Nageeb Ali & Charles Lin, Why People Vote: Ethical Motives and Social Incentives, 5 AMER.
ECON. J. MICRO 73 (2013).
236 See Lynn Sanders, The Psychological Benefits of Political Participation. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association (2001); see also Jennifer Davis, Voting as empowerment practice. 13 AM. J.
PSYCH. REHAB. 243 (2010).
237 See Alois Stutzer & Bruno Frey, Political Participation and Procedural Utility: An Empirical Study, 45 EUROPEAN
J. OF POLIT. RES. 391 (2006).
238 See T. Bolsen, P.J. Ferraro, & J.J. Miranda, Are Voters More Likely to Contribute to Other Public Goods? Evidence
from a Large-Scale Randomized Policy Experiment, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 17 (2013), available at
https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12052
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action towards public goods contribution might be more cost-effective if targeted to voters
as opposed to non-voters.
Vignettes echo these research findings. Paul, a returning citizen, described the impact
of disenfranchisement:
I have no right to vote on the school referendums that will affect my children.
I have no right to vote on how my taxes is [sic] going to be spent or used, which
I have to pay whether I’m a felon or not. You know? So basically I’ve lost all
voice or control over my government.239
While the single act of voting might not be transformational for a returning citizen, the
research and the lived experiences of these citizens point to the importance of reenfranchisement as a symbol of dignity and equal stake-holding in society.
Perhaps most troubling, harms associated with FFD seem likely to disparately affect
poor and Black individuals.240 That is because these groups disproportionately carry
outstanding LFOs. While Black individuals represent nearly half (47.9%) of the registered
voters in our sample, they comprise over two-thirds (66.9%) of the observed people who owe
criminal court debt. Similarly, the average estimated income for people in our sample who
owe LFOs is less than the income for those who do not ($32,770 versus $37,991). Other
correlative research indicates that poor and Black defendants likely bear the brunt of LFOs.241
Therefore, the likely race- and class-specific impacts of FFD further militate against this
policy.

VI. CONCLUSION: ENDING FELONY FINANCIAL
DISENFRANCHISEMENT
Policymakers who advance conditioning voter eligibility on repayment of criminal
assessments have alluded to two main justifications. First, they assert financial preconditions
are consistent with and facilitate rehabilitation. “[They] believe in redemption. [they] believe
in second chances. [they] believe in restoration.”242 Second, proponents of financial
prerequisites maintain such a policy “would actually help the [S]tate because if fines, costs
and restitution are a requirement . . . for those that want to vote, there’s a big motivation to
pay unpaid costs, fines and restitution.”243 According to proponents of these views, any

239

See Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Imprisoning America: The Social Effects of Mass Incarceration, 165-204
(2004).
240 See Beth A. Colgan, Beyond Graduation: Economic Sanctions and Structural Reform, 69 DUKE L.J. 69 1529 (2020);
see also Steven Mello, Speed Trap or Poverty Trap? Fines, Fees, and Financial Wellbeing, Working Paper (2018).
241 Other studies have confirmed that the brunt of LFOs fall on poorer and Black individuals. See, e.g., Meredith
& Morse, supra note __, at __; Morse, supra note __, at __.
242 See Scott Powers, House panel clears ‘guardrail’ bill for felon voting rights restoration, Florida Politics (March 19,
2019) at https://floridapolitics.com/archives/291304-amendment-4-enabling-bill/ See also Steven Lemongello,
Amendment 4 Advocates Criticize Florida House Bill that Adds Restrictions to Felon Voting Rights, ORLANDO SENTINEL
(March
19,
2019)
at
https://www.theledger.com/story/news/crime/2019/03/19/
amendment-4-advocates-criticize-florida-house-bill-that-adds-restrictions-to-felon-voting-rights/5674221007/
243 See Case No. SC19-1341 https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legal-work/09-18-2019%20SOS%20
Initial%20Brief%20On%20Merits.pdf.
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collateral costs are insubstantial given low electoral participation among the returning citizen
population.244
In this Article, we descriptively and empirically confront these lines of reasoning. The
abject administrative disarray surrounding the calculation of court debt halts progress toward
re-enfranchisement and blunts any pretense that mandating FFD is a path to redemption.
Data limitations, bureaucratic inertia and underfunding, and arcane accounting methods
prevent experts let alone ordinary citizens from determining LFO balances. Well-intentioned
returning citizens, who are often dealing with indigency and trying to reintegrate into society,
certainly cannot be expected to surmount these challenges. Failure to settle criminal court
debt lies with the state, not with rehabilitated individuals with felony histories.
With respect to the pecuniary interests that states derive from LFOs, we find the
putative benefits to be trivial. Our data illustrate inflows of criminal court debt become
stagnant shortly after their assessment. Furthermore, the pool of individuals states draw
revenue from — generally the indigent with limited labor market opportunities — do not
possess means to settle long-term criminal financial liabilities. Resource constraints among
returning citizens, therefore, explain the inconsequential revenue streams and counter claims
that eligibility conditional on absence of court debt facilitates reconciliation.
Though FFD has few social benefits, we confirm its social costs in the empirical
research presented here. Using quasi-experimental methods, we find evidence that confusion
surrounding eligibility deterred participation among qualified voters in the 2020 election.
Specifically, we compare voter participation between two groups of virtually identical
returning citizens in Florida. Our non-partisan, non-profit advocacy group, Free Our Vote,
and agency partners conducted an outreach campaign through which one group received
notification of their eligibility; the second group did not receive any contact. Relative to the
control group, we observe a statistically significant 16% increase in cast ballots among the
contacted group.
In a separate quasi-experimental design, we compare voter participation between two
groups of observationally equivalent returning citizens who hold criminal court debt. Free
Our Vote implemented a debt relief program that first cleared LFOs, then notified
individuals of their eligibility. While one group benefited from the program, the other did
not. We estimate Free Our Vote’s debt relief program increased participation relative to the
counterfactual group by nearly 26%.
Together, the empirical evidence suggests confusion and indigency alienate an already
marginalized sub-population. But for negligible financial inflows easily outweighed by social,
implementation, and enforcement costs associated with FFD, no tangible benefits exist.
Moreover, insistence on LFO repayment adversely impacts poor and Black defendants.
Put simply, the collective evidence shows the justifications behind felony financial
disenfranchisement do not survive scrutiny. FFD’s negligible financial inflows are easily
outweighed by social, implementation, and enforcement costs associated with it. The
interests of states and their denizens would best be served through FFD’s elimination.
244 John Pacenti, Felon Voting: Forcing Fees to be Paid Not an Issue for Some Wealthy Felons, PALM BEACH POST (Oct.

1, 2020). Opponents of S.B.7066 were not so sanguine about its impact. See ACLU of Florida Statement on House
Bill Restricting Amendment 4, ACLU Florida (March 19, 2019) https://www.aclufl.org/en/press-releases/acluflorida-statement-house-bill-restricting-amendment-4. (quoting Kirk Bailey, the political director of the ACLU:
“If this bill passes, it will undoubtedly continue to disenfranchise those who have already served their time and
paid their debt to society…This will inevitably prevent individuals from voting based on the size of one’s bank
account.”).
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